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ASSURANCES OF TITLES TO REAL PROPERTY AVAILABLE
IN THE UNITED STATES: IS A PERSON WHO ASSURES A
QUALITY OF TITLE TO REAL PROPERTY LIABLE FOR A




Whaddya mean you own this property and I don't?
What do you mean that you have the right to build a road over a por-
tion of my property?
Why do you think that you can put my property up for sale because
someone else did not pay you money?
What makes you think you have a lien against this property that is su-
perior to my lien?
Most certainly, the foregoing questions would likely be uttered in a
more serious vein than the currently famous or infamous
query-"Wassup"- or the equally famous or infamous rhetorical ques-
tion- "How ya doin'." A person who confronts a situation that would give
rise to any of the questions noted above, or which would evoke similar in-
quiries, is likely to be very interested in ascertaining whether the adverse
claim is or is not valid. Regardless of the validity or invalidity of any such
adverse claim, it is also likely that the person who fears that he, she, or it
will be adversely affected by the claim will want to know if someone else
has a responsibility to "take care of the problem." Whether someone else
has a duty to "take care of the problem" depends upon what, if any, type of
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title assurance is in place for the benefit and protection of the aggrieved or
apprehensive party.
Regardless of whether a person's fundamental beliefs concerning prop-
erty] can be characterized as an intuitive image or vision,2 a republican im-
age or vision,3 a liberal image or vision,4 a utilitarian image or vision,5 the
essence of that person's beliefs pertains to the concept of ownership.
6
Thus, people who stand to acquire ownership of an interest in real prop-
erty, 7 particularly people who contemplate acquisition of ownership of an
interest in real property8 by means of a purchase of that interest, usually
seek to receive a particular quality of title. Consequently, people who con-
template the acquisition of, or actually acquire, ownership of an interest in
1. A definition of property is set forth in CAL. CIV. CODE § 654 (West 1982) that reads as
follows: "The ownership of a thing is the right of one or more persons to posses and use it to the
exclusion of others. In this Code, the thing of which there may be ownership is called property."
2. CURTIS J. BERGER & JOAN C. WILLIAMS, PROPERTY LAND OWNERSHIP AND USE 1-10
(4th ed. 1997). The intuitive image of property is based on the notion that individuals expect that
they will gain certain advantages and benefits from owning property. Proponents of this image
adhere to a belief of "absolute ownership" (one can do with his, her, or its property as he, she, or it
pleases). Id.
3. Id. at 28-63. Proponents of a republican theory or image of property rights adhere to the
basic notion that property ownership allows citizens to have personal independence, which en-
ables citizens to pursue the common good instead of concentrating on their own self-interest. Id.
at 34. Under an elitist republican theory, participation in civic matters is restricted to certain cate-
gories of property owners. Id. at 34-35. The egalitarian republican theory is founded upon the
notion that land is common stock to all citizens, and economic and political safeguards must be
instituted and maintained to ensure widespread distribution and redistribution of property rights.
Id. at 35.
4. Id. at 64-111. Those who adhere to the liberal vision envision a society of equal individu-
als who are motivated principally, if not exclusively, by their passions or self-interests. Id. at 64.
See generally Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347
(1967) (examining "externalities" that result from use of property to serve self-interests and the
thesis that a primary function of property rights is to internalize costs that would otherwise exist as
"externalities").
5. JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 53-54 n.2 (5"' ed. 2002). The concept
upon which the utilitarian theory is based is that people obey principles of law because it is in
their common interest to do so not because they are obligated to do so. Id. The concept of prop-
erty and the laws pertaining thereto are merely artifacts, human inventions, social institutions, and
a means of societal organization. Id. Some scholars regard the utilitarian theory of property as
being the dominant view of property today. Id. at 53; see also, Demsetz, supra note 4, at 347.
6. Joan Williams, The Rhetoric of Property, 83 IOWA L. REV. 277 (1998) (explaining prop-
erty theories and concepts of rights of ownership).
7. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 658 (West 1982) (defining real property as consisting of land,
that which is affixed to land, that which is incidental or appurtenant to land, or that which is im-
movable from land by operation of law). An accepted definition of "land" is that it is the material
of the earth whatever may be the ingredients of which the earth is comprised, and it includes air-
space below and above the surface of the earth. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 659 (West 1982).
Personal property can be defined as every kind of property that is not real property. See, e.g.,
CAL. CIV. CODE § 663 (West 1982).
8. 14 RICHARD R. POWELL & PATRICK J. ROHAN, POWELLL ON REAL PROPERTY §
81.02[l][b], at 81-27 to -29 (Michael A. Wolf ed., 2000).
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real property often arrange for and receive various forms of assurances as to
the quality of the title tendered and ultimately acquired.
In the next segment of this article, I present information about types of
assurances of title that are available to persons who acquire or who are con-
sidering the acquisition of an interest in real property located in the United
States. These forms of title assurance are express or implied covenants or
warranties of title included as part of a contract for the sale of an interest in
real property, deed covenants or warranties of title, the scope of protection
afforded under land record title systems, abstracts of title, attorney opinions
of title, and title insurance.
In the third segment of this article, I explore the extent to which a per-
son who provides assurances of title is liable for or exposed to a possible
risk of loss regarding a title defect that is caused by conduct of the assured.
Title insurance is the final form of title assurance that I address in the third
segment of this article. Standard forms of policies of title insurance include
printed exclusions from policy coverage of defects, liens, encumbrances,
adverse claims, or other matters created, suffered, assumed, or agreed to by
the insured claimant.9 A body of case law exists regarding the manner in
which these exclusions from coverage are construed.0 However, there is a
dearth of case law regarding the question of whether a person who assures a
quality of title to real property under a form of title assurance other than a
policy of title insurance may or may not be potentially liable for a title de-
fect caused by conduct of the assured. Portions of the commentary included
in the third segment of this article address the foregoing question and offer
reasons for the apparent lack of case law on the point with respect to forms
of assurances of title other than a policy of title insurance.
II. FORMS OF TITLE ASSURANCE AVAILABLE TO PERSONS
WHO ACQUIRE AN INTEREST IN REAL PROPERTY LOCATED
IN THE UNITED STATES
A person who is transferred title to an interest in real property that is
located in the United Statesl" may acquire or receive a variety of types of
9. OLIN BROWDER ET AL., BASIC PROPERTY LAW 865-66 (5th ed. 1989) (quoting 5 3(a) of
the pre-printed "Exclusions from Coverage" included.in an American Land Title Association
(ALTA) form of policy of title insurance).
10. Joel E. Smith, Annotation, Title Insurance: Exclusion Of Liability For Defects, Liens, Or
Encumbrances Created, Suffered, Assumed, Or Agreed To By The Insured, 87 A.L.R.3d 515
(1978).
11. In this article, I present material that pertains only to various forms of title assurances
that are available to acquirers of interests in real property under the laws in effect in the United
States. This article does not include any comparative study on whatever similarities or differences
might exist between methods of title assurance that are part of the jurisprudence of the United
2003]
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assurances of the quality of that title. This is true regardless of whether a
person's acquisition of an interest in real property is the result of an inter
vivos, donative transfer,' 2 an inter vivos, sale transaction, 3 or a testamen-
tary transfer. 14
There are six types of assurances of title that are available to a person
who acquires an interest in real property located in the United States. These
six types of title assurances are:
(1) covenants or warranties of title that are either expressly or impliedly
contained in a contract for the sale of an interest in real property, 5
(2) deed covenants or warranties of title,16
(3) protection afforded under land record title systems, 17
(4) abstracts of title and abstractor's liability,18
(5) attorney opinions of title and the liability that attaches thereto,19 and
(6) title insurance. 20
A. CONTRACT COVENANTS OR WARRANTIES OF TITLE
A contract for the sale of an interest in real property includes at least
one covenant or warranty of title in the absence of a stipulation between the
parties in the contract to the contrary. 21 This covenant or warranty of title is
a promise on the part of the seller to deliver to the buyer either a judicially,
statutorily, or contractually defined marketable title.22 The law does not re-
quire a seller to deliver perfect title to a buyer.23 Some commentators sug-
gest that even if a contract for the sale of an interest in real property con-
tains a promise by the seller to deliver perfect title-a title that is not
States and the methods of title assurance that are part of legal systems of other countries or regions
of the world.
12. 2 DAVID A. THOMAS, THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY § 13.04, at 335 (2002).
13. 12 ALLEN M. WEINBERGER, THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY §§ 99.01-03, at 227-34
(1994).
14. 10 VICTORIA MIKESELL MATHER, THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY §§ 88.01-.17, at
218-439 (1998).
15. 14 POWELL, supra note 8, § 81.03[6]-[61[h], at 81-121 to -128.
16. Id. § 81A.06-.06[5], at 81A-1 12 to -132.
17. Id. §§ 82.01-.04[3], at 82-3 to -146 (recording acts) and §§ 83.01-.03[ii], at 83-3 to -26
(title registration).
18. 11 DAVID A THOMAS, THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY § 91.09(a)(5), at 56-58 (2002);
see also 12 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 13, § 99.10(b)(1), at 278-80 (regarding
abstracts of title); 11 JOHN L. MCCORMACK, THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY § 92.11 (a), at 216-
18 (regarding abstractor's liability).
19. 11 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 18, § 92.11 (b), at 218-20.
20. Id. §§ 93.01-93. 10, at 225-332.
21. 12 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 13, § 99.10(a)(1), at 275 n.217.
22. GEORGE LEFCOE, REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS 126 (3rd ed. 1990).
23. Id.
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burdened by any lien or encumbrance-to the buyer, it is probable that such
a promise could be successfully challenged as being illusory and therefore
unenforceable. 24 Such a promise would be illusory if the property in ques-
tion is nonexempt property that is subject to a lien for payment of real prop-
erty taxes. The promise would be illusory because it is impossible for the
seller to tender or deliver a title that is free and clear of all liens and encum-
brances. Consequently, the best quality of title that could be tendered in
that type of situation would not be a perfect title.
Whether a seller has or has not tendered or delivered a contractually,
judicially, or statutorily defined marketable title to a buyer is determined on
a transaction-by-transaction basis. 25 Whether a title is free from reasonable
doubt and is therefore marketable is tested from the standpoint of the pro-
spective purchaser and not that of either the prospective seller or of the
court.26 It follows that the quality of the title to an interest in real property
that is accepted as being marketable by a purchaser might be regarded as
unmarketable by a different purchaser.27
The parties to a contract for the sale of an interest in real property may
include an express covenant by the seller to transfer marketable title to the
buyer in the contract.28 Some contracts for the sale of an interest in real
property do not contain an express promise by the seller to transfer market-
able title to the buyer. 29 In that type of situation, such a covenant is never-
theless regarded as being a condition by implication, in the absence of a
specific contract provision to the contrary. 30 Where time is of the essence,
the buyer has the right to rescind the contract in the event that the seller is
not able to tender marketable title to the buyer as of the time when the seller
was supposed to perform that duty in accordance with the terms and provi-
sions of the sale contract.31
A seller's obligation to deliver a particular quality of title to a buyer
may be couched in specific contract provisions that are sometimes collec-
tively referred to as alternatives to the marketable title standards established
by law. 32 Thus, a seller and a buyer do not have to specifically or impliedly
rely upon criteria established by case or statutory law in the subject juris-
24. Id.
25. 12 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 13, § 99.10(a)(1), at 275-77.
26. Lucas v. Indep. School Dist. No. 284, 433 N.W.2d 94, 97 (Minn. 1988).
27. Id.
28. 12 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 13, § 99. 10(a)(1)-(2), at 275-78.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. § 99.15(d).
32. LEFCOE, supra note 22, at 129.
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diction to determine whether a seller's title is or is not marketable. A buyer
and a seller can stipulate to the use of other criteria to establish whether the
seller does or does not have title that is marketable. 33 Criteria commonly
used by sellers and buyers as an alternative to judicial or statutory defini-
tions of marketable title include: a title that is insurable, 34 a record title,
35
quality of title specifically approved by the buyer as an express condition
precedent to a closing of the sale transaction, 36 or any combination of those
criteria. 3
7
If a buyer is not careful, it is possible for the buyer to receive judicially
defined marketable title to a parcel of real property where the use of that
property is restricted by governmental regulation. In general, the mere ex-
istence of local building codes, zoning laws, subdivision laws, or other gov-
ernmentally imposed land use controls do not render title to real property
unmarketable because those laws, in and of themselves, are not treated as
encumbrances. 38 However, a violation of codes or laws that exists prior to
the formation of a contract for the sale of an interest in real property can re-
sult in the seller's title being regarded as unmarketable. 39 Evidence of a
violation of building or zoning laws that existed prior to the formation of a
33. Id.
34. Id.; see also 12 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 13, § 99.10(a)(2), at 277-78;
see also, Conklin v. Davi, 388 A.2d 598, 601-02 (N.J. 1978).
35. LEFCOE, supra note 22, at 129.
36. 14 POWELL, supra note 8, § 81.03[6][a], at 81-121 to -123.
37. See, e.g., Lohmeyer v. Bower, 227 P.2d 102, 105 (Kan. 1951). The contract that was
before the court in Lohmeyer provided that the seller would convey to the buyer title:
[b]y Warranty Deed with an abstract of title, certified to date showing good merchant-
able title or an Owners Policy of Title Insurance in the amount of the sale price, guar-
anteeing said title to party of the second part [Dr. Lohmeyerl, free and clear of all en-
cumbrances except special taxes subject, however, to all restrictions and easements of
record applying to this property, it being understood that the first party shall have suf-
ficient time to bring said abstract to date or obtain Report for Title Insurance and to
correct any imperfections in the title if there be such imperfections.
Id.; see also Conklin, 388 A.2d at 601 (regarding an express contractual provision that seller de-
liver to buyer a title that is both marketable and insurable).
38. See, e.g., Dover Pool & Racquet Club, Inc. v. Brooking, 322 N.E.2d 168, 169 (Mass.
1975).
39. See, e.g., Lohmeyer, 227 P.2d at 108; Bethurem v. Hammett, 736 P.2d 1128, 1134 (Wyo.
1987). The comments of the Wyoming Supreme Court in Bethurem indicate that the instant case
and similar cases are based upon the rationale that a buyer usually does not bargain for a lawsuit.
Id. at 1132. Consequently, if such a title is deemed marketable and if a buyer were forced to pur-
chase the subject property notwithstanding such an existing violation, the buyer would be put in a
position of being responsible for a correction of the violation. Id. at 1132. Being put in that posi-
tion is deemed contrary to the reasonable expectation of a buyer with respect to the title for which
the buyer has bargained. Id. at 1132. It follows, therefore, that by regarding the seller's title as
being unmarketable because of the existence of such a violation, the buyer's expectation is pro-
tected. Id. at 1131-32. If the seller's title is unmarketable under such a circumstance, the buyer
can cause the contract of sale to be rescinded. Id.
[VOL. 79:311
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contract for the sale of an interest in real property might not be included in
the public land title records. 40 Evidence of a violation of building or zoning
laws that existed prior to the formation of a contract for the sale of an inter-
est in real property might be undiscoverable by a mere reasonable and
proper inspection of the property.4 1 A buyer can militate against the conse-
quences of the existence of such a violation by negotiating for and receiving
contract covenants or warranties from the seller to the effect that the seller
has not received any notices of any such violation; has not made any im-
provements to the subject property without having obtained proper permits;
and is not aware of any violation of applicable building code, zoning law,
subdivision law, or other governmentally imposed land use regulation.4 2
Building codes, zoning laws, or other governmentally imposed land use
regulations might be adopted by the government after a contract for the sale
of an interest in real property has been created and while the contract is ex-
ecutory. 43 If the buyer seeks rescission of the contract after the seller's ob-
ligation to tender marketable title becomes due, a court may grant the
buyer's request for a rescission of the contract based either on the doctrine
of mistake44 or misrepresentation if the contract is silent as to whether a
violation of a governmental land use regulation enacted after the contract
was created does or does not render the seller's title as being unmarket-
able.4 5
It is well established that if a seller breaches a contract for the sale of
an interest in real property, the buyer can elect between the equitable reme-
dies of rescission or specific performance on the one hand and the legal
remedy of damages on the other. 46 However, if a buyer relies solely upon a
seller's contractual covenants of title assurance, the buyer is exposed to the
risk that such reliance is not prudent.47 A successful assertion of a cause of
action for specific performance by a buyer against a seller might not be pos-
sible.48 It is possible that the seller's present whereabouts and assets are
unknown.49 It is possible that the seller does not have the financial where-
40. Lohmeyer, 227 P.2d at 108.
41. Id.
42. LEFCOE, supra note 22, at 132.
43. Id. at 133.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. See, e.g., Beard v. S/E Joint Venture, 581 A.2d 1275, 1283-84 (Md. 1990); see also
Donovan v. Bachstadt, 453 A.2d 160, 163-65 (N.J. 1982).
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withal to satisfy an award of damages rendered in favor of the buyer due to
the seller's inability to fulfill the seller's contractual covenants or warranties
of title.50 A buyer's sole reliance upon a seller's contractual covenants or
warranties of title in any one of these circumstances will most certainly be
misplaced.5'
Buyers who rely upon sellers' contractual covenants or warranties of
title must also be mindful that they may not be able to enforce any cove-
nants or warranties after the close of the transaction in question has taken
place because of the merger doctrine.52 Professor Jessie Dukeminier and
Professor James Krier describe the merger doctrine as follows:
An old doctrine says that a contract merges into the deed, and once
the deed is accepted, the deed is deemed the final act of the parties
expressing the terms of their agreement. The buyer can no longer
sue the seller on promises in the contract of sale not contained in
the deed, but must sue the seller on the warranties, if any, con-
tained in the deed. There are recognized exceptions to the doctrine,
such as fraud and contractual promises deemed collateral to the
deed. . . . The merger doctrine is now in disfavor and is becom-
ing riddled with exceptions where the buyer does not intend to dis-
charge the seller's contractual obligations by acceptance of the
deed. 53
Although the merger doctrine has fallen to a state of disfavor according
to Professor Dukeminier and Professor Krier, their comments also show
that the doctrine has not been totally eradicated from the legal landscape
that currently exists in the United States.54 A postclosing claim of breach of
contract for the sale of an interest in real property is barred in various juris-
dictions under the merger doctrine when exceptions to the doctrine are
found to be inapplicable to the claim at hand.55
While a seller's contractual covenants or warranties of title offer a form
of protection, the buyer should not rely solely upon that form of title assur-
ance. 56 A prudent buyer will arrange for and receive protection under other
types of title assurance in addition to those provided by a seller in the form
of contractual covenants or warranties of title.57 One of these additional
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 5, at 601.
53. Id.
54. See, e.g., James v. McCombs, 936 P.2d 520, 524 (Alaska 1997).
55. See, e.g., Davis v. Tazewell Place Assoc., 492 S.E.2d 162, 165-66 (Va. 1997).
56. 11 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 18, § 94.07(b)(2)(ii), at 392-93.
57. Id.
[VOL. 79:31 1
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forms of title protection that is available to people to whom interests in real
property located in the United States are deeded is deed covenants or deed
warranties of title.58
B. DEED COVENANTS OR WARRANTIES OF TITLE
A deed is a written document pursuant to the terms of which an interest
in real property is transferred inter vivosly. 59 To be valid a deed, a written
document must identify the transferor,60 identify the transferee, 61 contain a
description of the real property in which the interest is transferred, 62 contain
words of unconditional transfer,63 be signed or subscribed by the trans-
feror, 64 be delivered to the transferee, 65 and be accepted by the transferee. 66
In at least two states, acknowledgment of the transferor's signature is also a
requirement that must be satisfied in order for a written instrument to be a
valid deed.67 However, in each of the other states and the District of Co-
lumbia, if the elements of a writing, identification of the transferor, identifi-
cation of the transferee, property description, words of unconditional trans-
fer, a signing or a subscription by the transferor, delivery to the transferee,
and acceptance by the transferee are all satisfied, the writing is a deed.68
The usual consequence of a lack of acknowledgment of the deed under the
58. DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 5, at 611-32.
59. Id.; see also BERGER & WILLIAMS, supra note 2, at 1272-76; cf. Hayes v. Hayes, 148
N.W. 125 (Minn. 1925). In the Hayes case, the court explains that in general, inter vivos transfers
of interests in real property cannot be created orally, but that an exception to that general rule is
the "executed parol gift" doctrine. Id. at 127.
60. BERGER & WILLIAMS, supra note 2, at 1272; see also 11 THOMPSON ON REAL
PROPERTY, supra note 18, § 94.07(j), at 404.
61. See, e.g., United States v. Stubbs, 776 F.2d 1472, 1474 (10th Cir. 1985); Board of Educ.
v. Hughes, 136 N.W. 1095, 1096 (Minn. 1912); see also 11 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, su-
pra note 18, § 94.07(n), at 407.
62. DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 5, at 613; 11 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra
note 18, § 94.07(s), at 410-11.
63. 11 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 18, § 94.07(m), at 406.
64. Id. § 94.07(o), at 407-08.
65. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1056 (West 1982); see also DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra
note 5, at 633-43.
66. 11 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 18, § 94.07(q), at 408 (noting that
"[o]ccasionally, grantees resist title by invoking the doctrine of [lack of] acceptance to avoid tax,
tort or toxic clean-up liabilities"); 14 POWELL, supra note 8, § 81A.04[l][a][iii], at 81A-40 n.15
(citing 4 H. TIFFANY, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 968 (Callaghan 3rd ed. 1975) wherein the
author suggests that a "conveyance" to a person not yet born should be treated as having created
an executory interest, subject to the constraints of the Rule Against Perpetutities, that will vest
upon the birth of the named but yet to be born transferee).
67. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-401(B); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5301.01 (Anderson
1989).
68. See supra notes 56-66 and accompanying text.
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laws of the latter jurisdictions is that the deed is not in a recordable form.69
A written document does not have to include a recital of consideration7O nor
be dated 7l to be a valid deed. In most jurisdictions, a document does not
have to be under seal to be a valid deed.72
It has been observed that "[oiwners don't pass the same deed down one
to another in succession. Each owner prepares and executes a new deed for
delivery to the grantee." 73 The foregoing observation follows from the re-
quirements that in order for a written instrument to be a deed, the written
instrument must contain a sufficient identification of the person who is the
transferor and the person who is the transferee. 74 A single deed is not
passed from one person to another regarding a particular parcel of real
property under the American system of jurisprudence because of the many
types of interests75 or the number of forms of ownership that can exist in or
against a particular parcel of real property at the same time. 76 It follows
from the foregoing that it is not possible for those various types of interests
and ownership forms to be created or terminated in the United States by a
continual use of but a single deed.
Whether and to what extent a person who has acquired an interest in
real property has also received deed warranties of title depends upon the
type of deed that the transferor delivered to the transferee. The types of
deeds that are in common use in the United States are general warranty
deeds, special warranty deeds, bargain and sale deeds, grant deeds, and
quitclaim deeds.77 In each state, particular forms of deeds are in common
use with respect to real estate sale transactions in accordance with either the
provisions of a statute or custom and practice.78 Furthermore, a particular
deed form might be in common use in a jurisdiction with respect to a trans-
fer of an interest in real property as a gift, but a different deed form might
69. 11 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 18, § 94.07(g), at 401-02.
70. 9 RONALD R. VOLKMER, THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, § 82.09(a), at 588 n.293
(David A Thomas ed., 1999); see also, Chase Federal Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Schreiber, 479 So.2d
90, 98-100 (Fla. 1985).
71. 11 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 18, § 94.07(p), at 408.
72. DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 5, at 614 n.3.
73. 11 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 18, § 94.07(a), at 386.
74. See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
75. 1 RICHARD R. POWELL & PATRICK J. ROHAN, POWELLL ON REAL PROPERTY chs. 12-13
(Michael A. Wolf ed., 2000); see also 2 RICHARD R. POWELL & PATRICK J. ROHAN, POWELLL
ON REAL PROPERTY chs. 14-15 (Michael A. Wolf ed., 2000) (describing various types of estates
that can be created in real property under the American system of property law).
76. See 7 RICHARD R. POWELL & PATRICK J. ROHAN, POWELLL ON REAL PROPERTY chs.
49-54 (Michael A. Wolf ed., 2000) (wherein various concurrent forms of ownership that can cre-
ated under the American system of property law are described).
77. 11 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 18, § 94.07(a)-(b)(2)(i), at 386-92.
78. Id. § 94.07(b), at 387.
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be commonly used in that same jurisdiction concerning a sale of an interest
in real property. 79 Of course, the parties to a real estate sale transaction can
agree to a form of deed that differs from the form of deed that is the most
commonly used in the jurisdiction. 80 In addition, a donor of an interest in
real property can elect to use a deed form that differs from the form of deed
that is the most commonly used in the subject jurisdiction with respect to
transfers in the nature of a gift.81
The delivery of a general warranty deed to a transferee results in the
transferee receiving assurances from the transferor against title defects that
are the consequence of either conduct on the part of the transferor or con-
duct on the part of a predecessor-in-interest of the transferor. 82 In some
states, "a bargain and sale deed with full covenants" has the same effect as a
general warranty deed.83
The delivery of a special warranty deed to a transferee results in the
transferee receiving assurances from the transferor against title defects that
arise from conduct on the part of the transferor only.84 A bargain and sale
deed containing covenants against the conduct of the transferor only is re-
garded as being similar in purpose and legal effect as a special warranty
deed. 85
Authority exists that suggests that the covenants in a grant deed are
much "the same as those contained in special warranty deeds." 86 While that
may be true in some jurisdictions, in other states, the scope of the title as-
surances that arise from the use of a statutory form of grant deed is nar-
rower than the scope of assurances that arise out of the use of either a gen-
eral warranty deed or a special warranty deed. The same types of
warranties attach to both general warranty deeds and special warranty deeds
except that the scope of those warranties under a special warranty deed is
limited to defects that arise from conduct on the part of the transferor
only.87
No assurances of title attach to or arise out of the use of a quitclaim
deed.88 A bargain and sale deed without covenants is used in the real prop-
79. 9 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 70, §§ 82.01-.15, at 537-691.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 5, at 612; see also 14 POWELL, supra note 8, §
81A.03[1 ][b] [iii, at 81 A-28.
83. 11 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 18, § 94.07(b)(1)(iii), at 389.
84. Id. § 94.07(b)(2)(i), at 390; see also DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 5, at 612.
85. 14 POWELL, supra note 8, § 81A.03[1][b][iii], at 81A-29.
86. 11 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 18, § 94.07(b)(2)(i), at 390.
87. Id. at 390-92.
88. DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 5, at 612.
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erty marketplace in some jurisdictions.89 Such a bargain and sale deed is
the functional equivalent of a quitclaim deed.90
Many other labels are used to refer to deeds in the real estate market-
place. 91 A sampling of those labels follow: sheriff's deed, executor's deed,
trustee's deed, and guardian's deed.92 Regardless of what label is used to
refer to a particular deed, functionally, the deed is either a type of general
warranty deed, type of special warranty deed, or a type of quitclaim deed. 93
A number of states have adopted some type of statutory short form
deed for general use within those states.94 At least one authority includes a
state-by-state table to illustrate which type of statutory short form deed is
currently in effect in each state. 95
A transferor under a general warranty deed either expressly or im-
pliedly undertakes six covenants of title for the benefit of the transferee. 96
Those covenants of title are: (1) the covenant of seisin, 97 (2) the covenant of
the right to convey, 98 (3) the covenant against encumbrances, 99 (4) the
covenant of warranty,1OO (5) the covenant of quiet enjoyment,101 and (6) the
89. 14 POWELL, supra note 8, § 81A.03[1][b][iii], at 81A-29.
90. Id. § 81A.03[1][b][iii]-[1I[c], at 81A-28 to -29.
91. 9 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 70, § 82.04(c), at 550.
92. Id.
93. Id. § 82.04(b), at 549-50; 11 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 18, § 94.07(b),
at 387.
94. 9 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 70, § 82.04[c], at 550-55.
95. Id. at 551-55.
96. 11 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 18, § 94.07(b)(1)(ii), at 387-89; see also
DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 5, at 612-13, 616.
97. 9 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 70, § 82.10(c)(l), at 608-11. By means of
the covenant of seisin, transferors warrant that they own the estate that they purport to convey to a
transferee. Id.
98. Id. § 82.1 0(c)(2). Under a covenant of right to convey, a transferor warrants that he, she,
or it has the right to convey the subject estate or other interest in real property that is a subject
matter of the conveyance. Id. In most instances, the covenant of right to convey is functionally
equivalent to the covenant of seisin when the conveyance in question involves the transfer or pur-
ported transfer of a freehold estate-a fee simple, a life estate, or where recognized, a fee tail. Id.
However, it is possible that a person is seized of an estate (i.e., has legal title to the estate) but
does not have the right to convey that estate under specified circumstances. Id. Consider, for ex-
ample, a situation where a parcel of real property is held in trust under a trust instrument that for-
bids the trustee from selling the trust property and thereby conveying the property in question to
someone other than a remainder beneficiary effective as of the time of the expiration of the trust or
to the settlor in the event of a revocation of the trust. GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT & GEORGE
TAYLOR BOGERT, BOGERT TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 741 at 401-04 (2nd ed. West 1982).
99. 9 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 70, § 82.10(c)(3), at 611-15. A covenant
against encumbrances involves a transferor warranting that there are no encumbrances against the
transferred estate other than those identified and agreed to by the transferee. Id. Encumbrances
include, among other items, liens, easements, and land use covenants. Id.
100. Id. § 82.10(c)(4) at 615-21; see also 14 POWELL, supra note 8, § 81A.03[l][b][i], at
81A-28; McDonald v. Delhi Sav. Bank, 440 N.W.2d 839, 843 (Iowa 1989). The covenant of gen-
eral warranty is considered to be of prime importance and the label "warranty deed" is derived
from this warranty. 14 POWELL, supra note 8, § 81A.03[l][b][i], at 81A-28. By use of the cove-
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covenant of further assurances.102 These same six covenants of title can be
expressly included in a special warranty deed or be statutorily deemed a
part of a special warranty deed.103 However, as previously noted, the trans-
feror under a special warranty deed undertakes responsibility only for a
breach of any of those covenants that is the result of conduct of the trans-
feror.104 If a defect in title exists that was caused by the conduct of a prede-
cessor of a transferor under a special warranty deed, the transferor is not li-
able to the special warranty deed transferee, nor to successors-in-interest of
that transferee, for damages suffered by the latter caused by the title de-
fect. 105
The implied assurances that arise by statute in some jurisdictions in
connection with the delivery of a grant deed are basically two in number.
The first assurance is that the grantor has not granted or conveyed any right,
title, or interest therein of the same estate to any person other than the
grantee. 10 6 The second assurance is an assurance against encumbrances. 10 7
nant of general warranty, transferors warrant that they will defend against lawful claims and will
compensate a transferee for any loss that the transferee may sustain by virtue of the assertion by a
third party of a title to the property in question that is superior to that claimed by the transferor at
the time of the transfer. 9 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 70, § 82. 10(c)(4), at 615-
21. If the transferee successfully defends the claim of the third party, the claim of the third party
was not lawful. LEFCOE, supra note 22, at 177. As a consequence, the transferor is not liable for
the attorney's fees and costs incurred by the transferee in connection with the transferee's success-
ful defense against the third party claim. Id. Some jurisdictions require that a transferee give no-
tice of the third party claim to the transferor and demand that the transferor undertake the costs of
defense against the claim of the third party as a condition precedent to allowing a transferee to
recover costs and attorney's fees from the transferor if the transferor does not undertake the de-
manded defense on behalf of the transferee and thereby breaches the covenant of general war-
ranty. See, e.g., Bloom v. Hendricks, 804 P.2d 1069, 1071 (N.M. 1991).
101. 9 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 70, § 82.10(c)(5), at 621. By inclusion
of a covenant of quiet enjoyment in a warranty deed, a transferor warrants that a transferee will
not be disturbed in possession and enjoyment of the property by an assertion of superior title by a
third person. Id. Some authorities consider the covenant of quiet enjoyment as being the func-
tional equivalent of the covenant of general warranty. Id.
102. Id. § 82.10(c)(6), at 622; see also, GRANT S. NELSON & DALE A. WHITMAN, REAL
ESTATE TRANSFER, FINANCE, & DEVELOPMENT 169 (3d. ed. 1987). The covenant of further as-
surances is a transferor's promise to a transferee to do anything that might be necessary to perfect
title in that transferee. Id. Performance of this promise might entail the execution and delivery of
additional documents. Id.
103. 11 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 18, § 94.07(b)(1)(iii)-(b)(2)(ii), at 389-
93.
104. Id. § 94.07(b)(2)(i), at 390.
105. 14 POWELL, supra note 8, § 81A.03[1][b][iii], at 81A-28.
106. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-435 (West 2000); CAL. CIV. CODE §1113 (West
1982); IDAHO CODE § 55-612 (Michie 2000); MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-20-304 (2002); NEV. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 111.170 (Michie 1998); N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-10-19 (1999); OR. REV. STAT. §
93.850 (2001); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 43-25-10 (Michie 1997); TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 5.023
(Vernon 1984).
107. Id.
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The covenants of seisin, right to convey, and against encumbrances that
inure to the benefit of a transferee under a general warranty deed or a spe-
cial warranty deed are sometimes referred to as "present covenants." 108 The
term "present covenants" is derived from the fact that those covenants are
either breached or not breached as of the time of the delivery of the war-
ranty deed and at no other time. 109 Therefore, the word "present" in the
term "present covenants" connotes the time at which the warranty deed in
question was delivered. 110
If a transferor's breach of a present covenant occurs at the time of the
delivery of a warranty deed, the transferee has a chose in action as a result
of that breach. "' A chose in action is a right to pursue an action at law to
procure payment of a sum of money.1 2 The common law rule is that a
chose in action cannot be assigned." 3 Application of that rule of law to pre-
sent covenants by the courts has resulted in the conclusion that such cove-
nants are personal to the warranty deed transferee and cannot be enforced
against the transferor of the warranty deed by a remote transferee.114 The
foregoing is the basis for the formulation of the common law rule that per-
sonal deed covenants or warranties of title do not run with the land."15
In some states, owners of certain types of choses in action have the
power to assign those rights.116 The common law prohibition against such
assignment is not followed in these states because of statutory law that
abolishes the common law prohibition against assignment17 because of
case law that is founded either upon a finding that the common law is re-
pugnant to a public policy of the state1 18 or because the concept of vertical
privity.119 In such jurisdictions, remote transferees have standing to enforce
present covenants of title against a remote transferor.120 Of course, a re-
108. DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 5, at 616.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. See, e.g., Rockafellor v. Gray, 191 N.W. 107, 108 (Iowa 1922).
112. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 234 (7th ed. 1999).




117. 9 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 70, § 82.10(e), at 624.
118. Rockafellor, 191 N.W. at 108.
119. 9 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 70, § 82.10(d), at 623.
120. Id. In a jurisdiction that allows a chose in action based on a breach of a present cove-
nant to be assigned, the instrument of assignment is deemed to be the deed delivered by the im-
mediate transferee to a subsequent transferee and so on. For example, suppose that X delivered a
general warranty deed to Y. In time, Y delivered a special warranty deed to Z. Subsequently, 0,
the person who is the true owner of the property, ousts Z from the property. Also suppose that Y
is not liable for the damages sustained by Z because O's paramount title is not the result of any
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mote transferee must prosecute such a claim against a remote transferor in a
timely manner. 121
The covenants of warranty, quiet enjoyment, and further assurances
that are expressly or impliedly made by a transferor under a general war-
ranty deed or a special warranty deed are commonly referred to as future
covenants.122 The term "future covenants" evolved from the verity that a
breach of any one of those covenants can occur, if a breach will occur at all,
at some point in time after the delivery of the subject warranty deed.123
The common law regards future covenants as being promises that touch
and concern land.' 24 As a consequence, future covenants are deemed to
"run with the land."125 In other words, future covenants of title not only
arise for the benefit of the immediate transferee under a general warranty
deed or certain types of special warranty deeds, but they also inure to the
benefit of remote transferees. 126 Thus, remote transferees have standing to
assert a timely and appropriate claim against a remote transferor for breach
of a future covenant of title under the common law.127 These common law
rules pertaining to future covenants are currently in force in all of the states
and the District of Columbia. 128
The courts have construed the two statutory warranties of title that at-
tach to a grant deed as being personal to the transferee. 29 As a result, re-
mote grantees do not have standing to assert a claim of breach of either or
both of those warranties against a remote grant deed transferor. 30 The
courts have adopted this line of reasoning notwithstanding language in the
subject statutes that arguably merit a conclusion that the warranties in ques-
tion are not personal' 3' and in spite of the fact that some of those same
courts have adopted the so-called modem law approach, which states that
conduct on the part of Y. If Z pursues claims against X that X breached the covenants of seisin
and right to convey, Z will be regarded as having been impliedly assigned each present chose of
action by virtue of the delivery of Y's special warranty deed to Z. Put another way, Y's special
warranty deed constituted both an instrument of conveyance and an instrument of assignment.
See, e.g., Rockafellor, 191 N.W. at 108.
121. 9 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 70, § 82.10(d), at 623.
122. Id. § 82.10(c), at 607.
123. 11 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 18, § 94.07(c)(1), at 397.





129. See, e.g., Babb v. Weemer, 37 Cal. Rptr. 533, 535-36 (Cal. Ct. App. 1964).
130. Id.
131. 11 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 18, § 94.07(b)(2)(i), at 390-92.
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present covenants under a general warranty deed or another form of special
warranty deed are able to be assigned. 132
The scope of the assurances of title under deed warranties that inure for
the benefit of an immediate or remote transferee is not without limits. As is
the case with other forms of title assurance, one manner in which the assur-
ance under a warranty deed or a grant deed is limited is by the verbiage that
is used to describe or define the assurance. 133 Another way in which the
scope of the assurance under a warranty deed or a grant deed is limited is by
virtue of the measure of damages available to a protected person if a breach
of a deed covenant or warranty of title occurs. 134 Like contract covenants
or warranties of title, a potential limitation on the effectiveness of deed
covenants or warranties of title is the possible inability of the transferor to
prevent or satisfy whatever damages that might be suffered by the protected
person.135 Consequently, a transferee under a warranty deed or a grant deed
should not rely solely upon the express or implied covenants or warranties
of title that attach to those forms of deeds. 136
C. LAND RECORD TITLE SYSTEMS
A few comments about the land record title systems that are in effect in
the United States are in order before we turn to the topics of abstracts of ti-
tle, attorney opinions, and title insurance.
Land record title systems are in use in many countries of the world. 137
Two types of land record title systems are in use in the United States. 38
Those record title systems are the Torrens Title Registration System and the
Recording System.139 Brief overviews of these systems follow.
1. The Torrens Title Registration System
The Torrens Title Registration System is one of five general types of
title registration systems used in the world.140 The Torrens Title Registra-
132. Id.
133. 14 POWELL, supra note 8, § 81A.06[2][iii], at 81A-122 to -123; see also JOHN E.
CRIBBET ET AL., PROPERTY CASES AND MATERIALS 1145-46 (8th ed. 2002); LEFCOE, supra note
22, at 174-76.
134. 14 POWELL, supra note 8, § 81A.06[1]-[4], at 81A- 112 to -130; CRIBBET, supra note
133, at 1159-61; 11 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 18, § 94.07(c)(2)-(3), 397-98.
135. 11 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 18, § 94.07(b)(2)(i), at 392.
136. Id.
137. 11 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 18, § 92.01, at 89.
138. Id. § 92.01, at 90.
139. Id.
140. See id. § 92.10(a), at 195 n.470 (citing "SIR ERNEST DOWSON & V.L.O. SHEPPARD,
LAND REGISTRATION, 98 (2d ed. 1964) (stating, "The other four are the English, German, Swiss,
and Ottoman title registration systems")).
[VOL. 79:31 1
2003] ASSURANCES OF TITLES TO REAL PROPERTY
tion System is named after its founder Sir Robert Richard Torrens.14' The
Torrens System was first implemented in Australia in the 1850s.142 The ba-
sic goal under the Torrens System of Title Registration is to make title re-
cords maintained by the government conclusive proof of ownership and of
the condition of title to a particular parcel of real property.143 Title regis-
tration systems adopted in the United States exist primarily for the benefit
of good faith purchasers for value'44 and private persons and governmental
entities that acquire interests in registered property 45 by condemnation.146
Historically, the Torrens System involves the following: (1) a lawsuit
adjudicating the then current state of the title to a particular parcel of real
property; (2) official registration of the adjudicated title evidenced by the
issuance of a certificate of title; (3) the maintenance of title records by a
registrar; (4) issuance of a new certificate by the registrar regarding each
transfer of title to the subject real property that occur subsequent to the ini-
tial registration of the adjudicated title; and (5) the establishment and
maintenance of an assurance or indemnity fund, the principal of which is
primarily comprised of fees collected by the registrar. 147
According to one set of sources, statutes authorizing the use of the Tor-
rens System existed in twenty states at one time.148 These same sources re-
port that in nine of those twenty states, the enabling statutes were either re-
141. Id. at 194.
142. Id.; see also DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 5, at 728.
143. 11 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 18, § 92. 10(b), at 196.
144. 14 POWELL, supra note 8, § 82.01[2][a]-[b], at 82-9 to -13. Under the nomenclature of
the common law, a "purchaser" is any transferee who receives an interest in real property regard-
less of whether the "purchaser" parted with value in return for the transfer. 73B C.J.S. Purchaser
559-60 (1983). Applying that meaning of the word "purchaser" means that the phrase "purchaser
for value" is not redundant. Id. Modernly, a "purchaser" is generally regarded as referring to
anyone who acquires any interest in real property for a valuable consideration. Id. Thus, the
phrase "bona fide purchaser" is commonly used modernly as opposed to the phrase "bona fide
purchaser for value." 5A WORDS AND PHRASES Bona Fide Purchaser 76 (West 1968). The mod-
em connotation of the word "purchaser" includes a person who is bound by the content of public
land records and who, therefore, is obligated to undertake a proper search of those records. 11
THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 18, § 92.09(b), at 165-66.
145. 14 POWELL, supra note 8, § 83.02[2][b], at 83-9 to -10.
146. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1001 (West 1982); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 8.24.010
(West 1992) (citing examples of state statutes that enable private persons to acquire particular
types of interests in real property via a private condemnation proceeding). The federal govern-
ment or a state government can condemn (i.e., take by eminent domain) privately owned property
for public use or for a public purpose pursuant to the Federal Constitution or a state constitution.
29A C.J.S. Eminent Domain §§ 4, 23, & 26 (1992). These constitutional and statutory laws re-
quire a private or public condemning party to pay just compensation for the interest taken by con-
demnation. Id. §§ 71-73.
147. 11 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 18, § 92. 10(b)-(e), at 196-203; see also,
DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 5, at 728-29.
148. 11 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 18, § 92.10(a), at 195.
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pealed or allowed to lapse.149 However, according to other sources, title
registration statutes were originally enacted into law in twenty-one states.150
Although title registration statutes are currently in force in ten states, 151 ac-
cording to at least one authority, the Torrens System has been "used to a
substantial extent in only five states: Hawaii, Illinois, Massachusetts, Min-
nesota and Ohio."152 Use of the title registration system in Hawaii and
Massachusetts is described in that same source as being "state-wide." 53
The Illinois Act enabling title registration was repealed in 1990.154 The
legislation by which the Illinois act enabling title registration was repealed
provided for a transition period that expired January 1, 1997.155
Although the Torrens System is based upon the concept that a certifi-
cate of title is conclusive proof of ownership, the title registration system
implemented in the United States includes legislatively or judicially created
exceptions to that basic concept. 156 The net result of the recognition and
application of these exceptions is that in the United States, a certificate of
title is a rebuttable presumption of ownership rather than conclusive proof
of ownership.157 The presumption is rebutted under any one of the recog-
nized exceptions.158 These exceptions include federal tax liens, statutory
liens, real property tax liens, short-term leases, easement claims based upon
visible conditions of the property in question, and fraudulent registration. 159
Various explanations have been offered as to why the Torrens Title
Registration System has not gained popularity in the United States. Those
explanations include: (1) costs associated with the initial adjudication proc-
149. Id.
150. 14 POWELL, supra note 8, § 83.01[3], at 83-5 n.7 (stating, "Statutes permitting registra-
tion were enacted in California, Colorado, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Massachusetts, Minnesota,
Mississippi, Nebraska, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia and Washington. See B. SHICK & I.
PLOTKIN, TORRENS IN THE UNITED STATES 18 (1978)").
151. Colorado (COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 38-36-101 to -199 (2002)); Georgia (GA. CODE ANN..
§§ 44-2-4 to 44-2-253 (Harrison 1998)); Hawaii (HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 501-1 to 501-211 (1993));
Massachusetts (MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 185, §§ 1-118 (West 1991)); Minnesota (MINN.
STAT. ANN. ch 508 (West 2002)); North Carolina (N.C. GEN. STAT. ch 43 (2001)); Ohio (OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. chs. 5309 & 5310); Pennsylvania (PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 321 & tit. 16, §
3708 (West 2001)); Virginia (VA. CODE ANN. § 55.112 (Michie 1995)); and Washington (WASH
REV. CODE ANN. ch. 65.12 (West 1994)).
152. 11 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 18, § 92.10(a), at 195.
153. Id.
154. 14 POWELL, supra note 8, § 83.01[3], at 83-6.
155. Id.; see also ILL. ANN. STAT. § 765 40/4 (repealed 1990).
156. 14 POWELL, supra note 8, § 83.02[3][b], at 83-12 to -14; see also DUKEMINIER &
KRIER, supra note 5, at 728
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ess;160 (2) the exceptions recognized under the American system of juris-
prudence that have resulted in certificates of title not being treated as con-
clusive proof of ownership; 161 (3) opposition to the title registration system
by title insurance companies, abstract companies, and attorneys; 162 (4) in-
adequate or inadequately trained personnel in the offices of registrars re-
sulting in substantial backlogs regarding the issuances of certificates of ti-
tle; 163 (5) costs incurred by the government regarding the creation,
maintenance, and use of a title registration system that are usually borne by
private parties instead of the government;164 and (6) the relatively narrow
scope of assurance afforded under the system.165
In essence, the assurance afforded to persons protected under the Tor-
rens System is indemnification for loss that is sustained in the registration
process.' 66 The Torrens System includes the establishment of a state regu-
lated assurance fund from which protected, aggrieved persons are indemni-
fied.167 The sources of revenues for these assurance funds come primarily
from payments of original registration fees, filing and indexing fees, and
fees paid in connection with an application to withdraw property from the
registration system. 168
Comparisons between the assurances provided under the Torrens Sys-
tem and under policies of title insurance have resulted in a conclusion that
the assurances provided by a typical policy of title insurance are broader in
scope than those provided under a Torrens Title Registration System.1 69 Of
course, the government can enact a Torrens System that includes the same
assurances as or assurances that are broader in scope than those which arise
160. DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 5, at 728-29; 14 POWELL, supra note 8, §
83.02[3][c], at 83-14 to -15; 11 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 18, § 92.10(g), at
205-09. In 1982, Minnesota became the first state to authorize initial registration by means of an
administrative process instead of a judicial process in an effort to reduce costs. See id. § 92.10(d),
at 198-201 (summarizing due process issues and the aftermath of the adoption of the Minnesota
statute that authorizes administrative, initial registration); Anh T. Le, The Effect of the Hersh De-
cision on the Torrens Act: Getting to the Root of the Problem - (Hersh Properties, LLC v.
McDonald's Corp., 558 N.W.2d 728 (Minn. 1999)) 26 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 601, 621-22
(2000).
161. DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 5, at 728; 11 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra
note 18, § 92.10(g), at 205-09.
162. 11 THOMPSON ON REALPROPERTY, supra note 18, § 92.10(g), at 205-09.
163. Id.
164. Id. § 92.10(h), at 209-14; see also 14 POWELL, supra note 8, § 83.02[3][c], at 83-14 to -
15.
165. 14 POWELL, supra note 8, § 83.03[10], at 83-25 to -26; 11 THOMPSON ON REAL
PROPERTY, supra note 18, § 92.10(f), at 203-05.
166. 14 POWELL, supra note 8, § 83.03[10] at 83-25 to -26.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. 11 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 18, § 92.10(f), at 205.
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in connection with the issuance of a policy of title insurance. 170 Notwith-
standing factors that have been cited as reasons for the lack of widespread
use of the registration system in the United States, favorable assessments of
the Torrens Title Registration System exist. 171
2. Recording Systems
As noted in prior passages of this article, the original Torrens Title
Registration System is founded on the premise that a certificate of title con-
stitutes conclusive proof of ownership and condition of title.172 However,
the Torrens Registration Systems adopted and implemented in the United
States provide methods by which government-maintained records serve as a
rebuttable presumption, not conclusive proof, of ownership and the condi-
tion of title.173 Not surprisingly, the recording systems put into effect in the
United States do not constitute conclusive proof or a conclusive statement
of ownership or condition of title to a particular parcel of real property.
174
Rather, the recording systems that are in use in the United States provide
methods by which evidence of title can be compiled, maintained, and ac-
cessed.175 A proper gathering and analysis of evidence of title under a re-
cording system involves adherence to required procedures for searching the
public records regarding land title that are maintained under the laws of a
particular jurisdiction176 and proper examination of the contents of all of the
documents that embody what is sometimes referred to as "the record chain
of title." 77
The public recording of documents that affect title to land began in the
Bay Colonies around 1640.178 The recording system was not part of Eng-
lish custom. 179 Consequently, the practice is unique to the American system
of jurisprudence when compared to the English common law. A character-
istic common to each of the types of recording statutes in effect in the
170. Id.
171. John L. McCormick, Torrens and Recording: Land Title Assurance in the Computer
Age, 18 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 61 (1992); C. Dent Bostick, Land Title Registration: An English
Solution to an American Problem, 63 IND. L.J. 55 (1987); Possessory Title Registration: An Im-
provement of the Torrens System, 11 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 825 (1985); Barry Goldner, The
Torrens System of Title Registration: A New Proposal for Effective Implementation, 29 UCLA L.
REV. 661 (1982).
172. See supra notes 144-47 and accompanying text.
173. See supra notes 156-59 and accompanying text.
174. DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 5, at 661, 663.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 663-64.
177. Id. at 695.
178. Id. at 661-62.
179. Id.
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United States is that those statutes supplant the common law doctrine of
first in time, first in right.180
A recording system can be used as a shield to assure that a current in-
terest in real property will not be adversely affected by the status of a sub-
sequent purchaser.1Sl Put another way, the owner of an interest in real
property should record evidence of that ownership in a timely and appropri-
ate manner for the purpose of protecting the owner against that interest be-
coming adversely affected by the acquisition of that same or a different in-
terest in the subject real property by a subsequent purchaser.182 To properly
use a recording act as a shield, a person must duly record a document that is
evidence of that person's ownership of an interest in the subject real prop-
erty.183 To be a duly recorded document, the document must be regarded
under the controlling law as a document that can be recorded,184 the docu-
ment must be proper in form,185 and must be properly indexed in the re-
cords of the Office of the Recorder or other government official who has
the responsibility of maintaining official land title records in a particular ju-
risdiction.186
A recording act can also be used as a sword to terminate or otherwise
adversely affect prior unrecorded interests in real property.187 Only those
people for whose protection a recording act has been enacted may use a re-
cording act as a sword.188 Some types of recording acts protect subsequent
purchasers for value regardless of whether they do or do not have knowl-
edge of a prior, unrecorded interest.1 89 Other types of recording acts protect
only subsequent, good faith purchasers for value.190 It appears that Colo-
rado has the only recording statute that provides protection to subsequent,
180. Id. at 663.
181. Id. at 705 n.17. "The term purchaser is uniformly held to apply to all parties who have
paid consideration for the interest acquired, including a mortgagee or a lessee." Id.; see also 14
POWELL, supra note 8, § 82.01[21[b], at 82-11 to -13 (summarizing the definition of the term
"bona fide purchaser").
182. DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 5, at 662.
183. Id.
184. See, e.g., HARRY D. MILLER, 5 MILLER & STARR, CALIFORNIA REAL ESTATE 3rd, §
11:6 (West Group 2000) (describing 116 of the various documents that may be recorded under the
law of California).
185. 14 POWELL, supra note 8, § 82.03[1], at 82-97 to -100.
186. DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 5, at 663-75
187. Id. at 663.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 685; see also LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 2721 (1996), N.C. GEN. STAT. § 47-18
(2003); see, e.g., Rowe v. Walker, 441 S.E.2d 156, 158 (N.C. 1994) (stating, "North Carolina does
not require that a purchaser for valuable consideration be an 'innocent purchaser"').
190. DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 5, at 685-87; see also, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE §§
1107, 1214 (1982); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 695.01 (1994); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 65.08.070
(1994).
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good faith purchasers who acquired their interest without giving value (i.e.,
acquisition of an interest in real property as a donee or as an heir). 191
Currently, there are basically three types of recording acts that are in
force in the United States: (1) race recording statutes, 192 (2) notice record-
ing statutes, 193 and (3) race-notice recording statutes. 194
The race type of recording act is the oldest type of recording statute in
use in the United States. 95 However, for a period of time prior to 1981,
Louisiana196 and North Carolina197 were the only two states with a race re-
cording statute in general use. 198 A few states utilize race statutes as a
means of determining priorities of liens, 99 but those same states use either a
notice statute or a race-notice statute regarding conveyances in general.200
For a period of time, twenty-three states had notice type recording acts in
general, 201 and twenty-five states and the District of Columbia had race-
notice types of recording acts in general use in those twenty-six jurisdic-
191. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-35-109 (2002). That statute protects "any person with
any kind of rights in or to such real property." Id. The statute does not specifically require such a
person to have given consideration for the right that they have acquired. See also 14 POWELL,
supra note 8, § 82.01[2], at 82-12 n. 41, § 82.02[2], at 82-80.
192. DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 5, at 685. A subsequent purchaser is able to use a
race-recording act as a sword even if the subsequent purchaser has knowledge or notice of a prior,
unrecorded interest. 11 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 18, § 92.08(a), at 158. The
paramount right as between the holder of the prior, unrecorded interest and the subsequent pur-
chaser is established by which of those persons is the first to record. Id.
193. DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 5, at 685-86. Subsequent purchasers are able to use
a notice statute as a sword by acquiring their interest without knowledge of the prior, unrecorded
interest. 11 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 18, § 92.08(b), at 159-60. Recording is
not a prerequisite to use a notice statute as a sword. Id. However, a subsequent, bona fide pur-
chaser who has gained a paramount interest in the property in question by means of using a notice
statute as a sword should record evidence of his, her, or its interest nevertheless. Id. § 92.04(a), at
99-100. If accomplished in a timely and proper manner, the recording of such evidence of title to
an interest in the subject property will serve as a shield against persons who subsequently acquire
an interest in the property in question. Id.
194. DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 5, at 686-87. To use a race-notice recording act as a
sword in jurisdictions other than Colorado, a subsequent purchasers must have their interest with-
out knowledge of the prior, unrecorded interest, and as between the holder of the prior, unrecorded
interest and the subsequent purchaser, the latter must be the first to record. II THOMPSON ON
REAL PROPERTY, supra note 18, § 92.08(c)-(d), at 160-63.
195. Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577, 586 (1988).
196. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 2721 (2002).
197. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 47-18 (2003).
198. 11 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 18, § 92.08(a), at 158.
199. Id.; see also ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-40-102 (1987).
200. 11 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 18, § 92.08(a), at 158; see also ARK.
CODE ANN. § 14-15-404 (Michie 1998).
201. 11 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 18, § 92.08(b), at 159 n.286 (listing the
following states: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Iowa, Kansas,
Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, Virginia, and West Virginia).
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tions.202 Presently, the recording act that is in effect in North Carolina is
deemed to be a type of race-notice statute and not a race statute, which was
how various authorities prior to 1981 characterized the recording act.203
Furthermore, the recording act that is in effect in Alabama is no longer re-
garded as being a type of notice statute, for it is currently also deemed to be
a type of race-notice statute.204 Based upon the foregoing, there are cur-
rently three categories of recording statutes that are in general use in the
United States. First, the race type of recording act is now in general use in
the state of Louisiana only. 205 Second, notice types of recording acts are
presently in general effect in twenty-two states. 206 Third, race-notice types
of recording acts are currently in general use in twenty-seven states and the
District of Columbia.207
202. Id. § 92.08(c), at 160 n.288 (listing the following states: Alaska, California, Colorado,
District of Columbia, Georgia, Hawaii, Indiana, Illinois, Idaho, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota,
Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Oregon, Penn-
sylvania, South Dakota, Utah, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming).
203. Id. § 92.08(a), at 158 n.283.
204. Baxter v. South Trust Bank of Dotham, 584 So.2d 801, 804 (Ala. 1989) (construing
ALA. CODE § 35-4-90 (1989)).
205. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 2721 (2002).
206. See I I THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 18, § 92.08(b), at 159 n.286 (citing
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 33-411 to -412 (West 2000); ARK. CODE ANN. § 14-15-404 (Michie
2002); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 47-10 (West 1995); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 153 (1989);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 695.01 (West 1994); IOWA CODE ANN. § 558.41 (West Supp. 1995); KAN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 58-2221 to -2223 (1995); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 383.080 (Michie 2002); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 201 (West 1999); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 183, § 4 (Law Co-op 2003);
MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 442.380, 442.390, 442.400 (West 2000); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 477:3-a
(1992); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-9-1 to -3 (Michie 2002); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5301.25 (An-
derson Supp. 2002); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, §§ 15-16 (West 1999); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-11-1
(1995); S.C. CODE ANN. § 30-7-10 (Law Co-op Supp. 2002); TENN. CODE ANN. § 66-5-106
(1993); TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 13.001 to .002 (Vernon Supp. 2003); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 27,
§ 342 (1998); VA. CODE ANN. § 55-96 (Michie 1995); W. VA. CODE §§ 40-1-8 to -9 (1997)).
207. See id. (citing ALA. CODE § 35-4-90 (1991)). Courts of the State of Alabama have con-
strued this statute as a race-notice recording act notwithstanding verbiage that at one time ap-
peared to put this statute in the notice act category. Id.; see also I I THOMPSON ON REAL
PROPERTY, supra note 18, § 92.08(b), at 159 n.288 (citing ALASKA STAT. § 40.17.080 (Michie
2002); CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1107, 1214 (West 1982); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 38-35-105, -108,
-109 (West 2002); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 42-401, -406 (1981); GA. CODE ANN. § 44-2-1 (Harrison
1993); HAW. REV. STAT. § 502-83 (1993); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 32-1-2-11, -16 (repealed 2002);
765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/30 (West 2001). It is noted that various scholars classify the Illinois stat-
ute as a notice statute notwithstanding that in 1882, the Illinois Supreme Court applied the statute
in a manner that indicates that the court construed the statute as if it were a race-notice recording
act. See 11 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 18, § 92.08(d), at 161 n.294 (citing
IDAHO CODE § 55-812 (Michie 2000); MD. CODE ANN. REAL PROP. § 3-203 (1996); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 565.29 (West 1998); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 507.34 (West 2002); MiSS. CODE
ANN. § 89-5-5(2003); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 70-21-201, -302, -304 (2001); NEB. REV. STAT. §§
76-237 to -238 (1996); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 111.320, .325 (1998); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:22-1
(West 2003); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 47-18 (2002). The North Carolina statute has been judicially
construed as a race-notice recording act even though the language in the statute appears to place it
in the race act category. See id. § 92.08(c) at 160 n.288 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-19-41
(1999); OR. REV. STAT. § 93.640 (2001); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 351 (West 2001); S.D.
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Some authorities propose that prospective purchasers of an interest in a
particular parcel of real property are under an obligation to search the public
records concerning the subject realty prior to the completion of the contem-
plated or pending sale transaction. 208 In reality, however, "the duty" to
which those authorities refer is not a duty at all in the absence of a contrac-
tual or fiduciary obligation that dictates otherwise. 209 Rather, it is conduct
that a purchaser would be prudent to undertake for the purchaser's own
protection. 210 Therefore, the undertaking of a search of the public records
by a prospective purchaser, or a person acting on behalf of the prospective
purchaser can be characterized as an act of prudence rather than a discharge
of a duty.211 By undertaking an appropriate search of public records and
examining the contents of all documents that are part of the chain of title or
causing such a search and examination to be undertaken, a prospective pur-
chaser is able to assess evidence of the state of the title to the property in
question.212 This search enables prospective purchasers to determine
whether the apparent state of the title to the interest under scrutiny is or is
not acceptable. 213
It is likely that few prospective purchasers personally engage in a
search of public records or an examination of the contents of chain of title
documents.214 Most purchasers rely upon the services of and the represen-
tations made by a professional title examiner and abstractor or an attorney,
purchase protection that is provided under the terms, provisions, conditions,
and stipulations of a policy of title insurance; or they do all or a combina-
tion of less than all of the foregoing. 215
In some jurisdictions, professional providers of title assurances, title in-
formation, and title services access, examine, and rely upon the public re-
cords as maintained by the Office of the County Recorder or other public
official or officials to whom the responsibility of maintaining such records
CODIFIED LAWS § 43-28-17 (Michie 1997); UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-3-103 (1988); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 65.08.070 (West 1994); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 706.08 (West 2001); WYO. STAT. § 34-
1-121 (2001)).
208. 11 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 18, § 92.09(b)(4), at 168-69; see also
Angle v. Slayton, 697 P.2d 940, 942 (N.M. 1985); Romero v. Sanchez, 492 P.2d 140, 143-44
(N.M. 1971).
209. IV AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 18.4, at 659 (A. James Casner, ed. 2d 1974)
(1952).




214. 11 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 18, §§ 92.05(a)(1)-(5), at 110-14.
215. Id. chs. 91-93.
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has been designated under the laws of those jurisdictions. 21 6 In other juris-
dictions, those professionals (in particular title companies and title insur-
ance companies) 217 access, examine, and rely upon documents that com-
prise privately owned and maintained "title plants." 2 18 Basically, the
documents that are maintained as part of a privately owned title plant are
copies of public land title record documents obtained from the Office of the
County Recorder or the office of some other public official charged with the
responsibility of maintaining public land title records. 219 Personnel of the
owner or maintainer of a title plant obtain those copies on a regular basis,
usually daily. 220 The copied public land title documents are then main-
tained as part of the privately owned "title plant."22I
Privately owned and maintained title plants are generally comprised of
two groupings of records. One grouping of documents that are part of a ti-
tle plant is commonly referred to as the property index, and the other
grouping of documents is commonly referred to as the general index,
sometimes referred to as "the G.I."222 Documents that affect title to real
property and include a description of the affected property are, not surpris-
ingly, the types of documents that comprise the property index portion of a
title plant.223 Copies of deeds, mortgages, deeds of trust, leases, memo-
randa of leases, options, rights of first refusal, and releases are a few of the
types of documents that are maintained as part of the property index of a
privately owned title plant.224 In contrast, a document that affects title to
real property even though a description of the affected real property is not
included in the text of the document is the type of document that is regarded
as part of the general index of a privately owned title plant.225 General in-
dex documents include judgment liens, abstracts of judgments, tax liens,
and bankruptcy petitions.
Documents and the information contained therein that constitute the
public records concerning real property are used to compile abstracts of ti-
tle, serve as the basis for an attorney's issuance of an opinion of title, or
serve as a benchmark for the determination of the scope of protection that is
216. BARLOW BURKE, REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS 170 (2d ed. 1999).
217. MARJORIE FLOYD BURCHETr, Title Search and Surveys, CALIFORNIA TITLE
INSURANCE PRACTICE, §§ 4.1-.25 (CEB attorneys eds. 1999).
218. BURKE, supra note 216, at 174.
219. BURCHETT, supra note 217, at §§ 4.1-.25.
220. Id.
221. Id.; see also DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 5, at 663-67.
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provided to an insured by a title insurer pursuant to the terms and provisions
of a policy of title insurance. 226 Comments that follow herein address ab-
stracts of title, attorney opinions, and title insurance.
D. ABSTRACTS OF TITLE
Generally speaking, an abstract of title is a title examiner's or title ab-
stractor's summary of the documents that comprise a chain of title.2 27 The
summary includes references to liens or encumbrances against that title.228
The documents comprising the subject chain of title are summarized in
chronological order.229 An abstract of title is statutorily defined in at least
one state as:
a written representation, provided pursuant to a contract, whether
written or oral, intended to be relied upon by the person who has
contracted for the receipt of such representation, listing all re-
corded conveyances, instruments or documents which, under the
laws of this state, impart constructive notice with respect to the
chain of title to the real property described therein. 230
As indicated by the foregoing descriptions and definitions of an ab-
stract of title, abstractors of title 23' undertake the duty to properly compile
an abstract of title.232 To properly compile an abstract of title, an abstractor
must perform a proper search of the public real estate records as they per-
tain to the real property that is described in the abstract,2 33 and the abstrac-
tor must set forth appropriate summaries of every transfer or other transac-
tion affecting the property in question during the span of time to which the
requested abstract pertains.234 An abstract of title will usually include a
certificate by the abstractor that refers to the periods of time covered by the
abstract of title and the records that are the subject matter of the abstract.235
226. See Corwin W. Johnson, Purpose and Scope of Recording Statutes, 47 IOWA L. REV.
231 (1962) (noting an in depth assessment of recording statutes and title plants).




230. CAL. INS. CODE § 12340.10 (West 1988).
231. RAY E. SWEAT, Abstractor or Abstracter, 289 PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE 345 (1987).
232. PAUL GOLDSTEIN & GERALD KORNGOLD, REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS CASES AND
MATERIALS ON LAND TRANSFER, DEVELOPMENT AND FINANCE 297 n.2 (3d ed. 1997).
233. Id. at 290.
234. Id.
235. See BURKE, supra note 216, at 176-77 (citing an example of an abstract of title that is
based upon CLINTON P. FLICK, 1 ABSTRACT AND TITLE PRACTICE 22-40 (2d ed. 1958)).
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By custom and practice, it is the current owner (i.e., the prospective
seller or other category of prospective transferor) who contracts with an ab-
stractor to provide a requested abstract of title.236 However, the prospective
seller, the prospective purchaser, and other persons are likely to rely upon
the contents of the abstract of title after the abstractor has issued it.237 The
third persons who are likely to rely upon the contents of an abstract of title
include legal counsel for the prospective seller, legal counsel for the pro-
spective buyer, prospective lenders, legal counsel for prospective lenders,
real estate brokers, and escrow companies or other types of real estate clos-
ers.238 For example, the prospective purchaser and any legal counsel for the
purchaser will likely rely upon an abstract of title to determine whether the
purchaser should accept or should reject the title evidenced by the ab-
stract.239 The degree, if any, to which a person other than the prospective
seller is able to hold an abstractor liable for a failure on the part of the ab-
stractor to properly compile an abstract of title depends upon whether the
laws of the subject jurisdiction do or do not regard a prospective purchaser
or other third party as a person to whom the duties of an abstractor are
owed.240
If a purchaser or other third person seeks recovery against an abstractor
under a breach of contract theory for injuries sustained by the purchaser or
other third person as a result of the purchaser's or other third person's reli-
ance upon the content of an abstract of title issued by the abstractor, the ap-
plication of traditional rules of contract law will result in the contract claims
of the purchaser or other third party being barred because of a lack of con-
tract privity between the purchaser or other third person and the abstrac-
tor.241 Use of lack of contract privity as a bar to recovery for the purchaser
or other third person is another way of looking upon the purchaser's or
other third party's reliance upon the abstract of title as being not reasonable
by the standards of traditional contract law. 242
However, in jurisdictions that do not adhere to the common law re-
quirement of strict contractual privity, a purchaser or other third party has
standing to pursue contract claims against an abstractor for alleged breach
236. 11 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 18, § 91.09(a)(5), at 56, § 92.11 (a), at
216-17.
237. Id. at 217
238. See, e.g., Williams v. Polgar, 215 N.W.2d 149, 151-52 (Mich. 1974).
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of the abstractor's duty to properly compile an abstract of judgment.243 Put
another way, the concept of contract privity as recognized in those jurisdic-
tions encompasses a wider circle of circumstances than the circumstance
that falls within the scope of the narrower common law version of the con-
cept of contractual privity. Most jurisdictions that continue to require some
form of contract privity, but do not adhere to the strict common law version
of contract privity, either judicially or legislatively endow contractual priv-
ity in purchasers and other classes of third persons by either regarding the
purchaser or other third person as a third party beneficiary 244 or by regard-
ing a purchaser or other third person as a third party who foreseeably, there-
fore reasonably, relied upon the content of an abstract of title.245
In recent years, judiciaries have circumvented the privity requirement
under contract law by allowing claims for damages by purchasers or other
third parties to be prosecuted against abstractors based upon theories for re-
lief that are part of the law of torts. 246 It appears that the tort theory that has
gained the largest degree of acceptance under this approach is negligent
misrepresentation. 247 Of course, it is one thing for a plaintiff to allege that
relief is due under the tort theory of negligent misrepresentation, for it is
another for the plaintiff to prove that all of the numerous elements of that
tort exist in the case at hand.248 The legislative process in some states has
resulted in the enactment of statutes that enable designated classes of third
parties to have direct relief against an abstractor for injuries suffered by a
third party that are the proximate result of an abstractor's failure to properly
compile an abstract of title.249
Abstracts of title are not the primary method of title assurance in cer-
tain sectors of the United States because of the time that must be expended
and the expense that is incurred in connection with the compilation of an
abstract of title. 250 Title insurance is the primary form of title assurance in
243. Williams, 215 N.W.2d at 152-53. The Michigan Supreme Court includes in its opinion
a listing of the following exceptions to the common law rule of strict contractual privity: "ab-
stracter's fraud or collusion; theory of third-party beneficiary contracts; theory of foreseeability of
use by a third-party; actual knowledge or notice of third-party; agent for disclosed or undisclosed
principal contracting with an abstracter; and re-issuance or re-certification of an abstract." Id.
244. See, e.g., Glanzer v. Shepard, 135 N.E. 275, 276 (N.Y. 1922); First Am. Title Ins. Co. v.
First Title Serv. Co., 457 So. 2d 467, 472-73 (Fla. 1984).
245. Williams, 215 N.W.2d at 158.
246. William B. Johnson, Annotation, Negligence in Preparing Abstract of Title as Ground
of Liability to One Other than Person Ordering Abstract, 50 A.L.R. 4", 314, 358-63 (1986).
247. Id.; see also, Williams, 215 N.W.2d at 158.
248. BURKE, supra note 216, at 175.
249. Johnson, supra note 246; see also Oscar A. Hall, Abstractor's Liability in Examination
of Title, 6 WYO. L.J. 184 (1952).
250. 11 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 18, § 93.01, at 225.
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those jurisdictions. 251 However, before turning to the topic of title insur-
ance, I present a brief summary regarding attorney opinions of title and at-
torney liability thereunder because such opinions are part of the custom and
practice that is in place in those jurisdictions in which abstracts of title are
still used as a form of title assurance. An additional reason for a brief ex-
amination of attorney opinions as a form of title assurance is that in some
regions of the country, title insurance is issued by or on behalf of a title in-
surance company based on an attorney's opinion of title that is rendered to
the title insurance company. 252
E. ATTORNEY OPINIONS
Attorneys, like abstractors, are liable for defects in their work prod-
uct.253 Historically, attorneys review and analyze the contents of abstracts
of title to determine and render opinions on whether the liens of mortgages
reported in the abstract have or have not been validly released, 254 whether
the enforcement of a particular lien is or is not barred by the applicable stat-
ute of limitations, 255 whether an express easement has or has not been ter-
minated, 256 or other matters that have a bearing upon the task of an attorney
furnishing an opinion regarding the current state of the title to the property
in question. 257 After completing an opinion, the attorney delivers the opin-
ion to the client of the attorney. The opinion can be in the form of either a
letter or a certificate. 258
It appears that attorneys have a great deal of latitude in preparing the
format and content of title opinions in the states in which the issuance of ti-
tle opinions is customary. 259 Most issuers of title opinions either create a
standard format over a period of time or adopt a format that is used in a
given jurisdiction as a matter of custom and practice. 260 Sample forms of
title opinions exist for the benefit of attorneys who take on the task of ren-
dering such an assurance of title.261 Of course, the practitioner may modify
a sample to meet the particular needs of the client. 262
251. Id.
252. Id. § 92.11(b), at 218 n.569.
253. GOLDSTEIN & KORNGOLD, supra note 232, at 297.




258. IV AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 209, § 18.99, at 847.
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The client to whom an attorney renders an opinion of title might be a
prospective seller, a prospective buyer, a prospective lender, or a prospec-
tive title insurer. For example, a prospective seller is likely to rely upon an
attorney's opinion to determine whether to sell the property in question,
whether to agree to certain contract covenants or warranties of title, whether
to agree to the delivery of a particular type of deed to which various types
of warranties of title attach upon a delivery of the deed (usually as of the
time of the closing of the transaction). 263
When an attorney who represents the prospective seller renders an
opinion of title, it is possible, perhaps even probable, that a prospective
buyer will rely to some extent or another on that opinion.264 Reasons for a
prospective buyer's reliance upon an opinion of title supplied by an attorney
who represents the prospective seller include the prospective buyer having
to decide whether or not to purchase an interest in a particular parcel of real
property under conditions, terms, or provisions proposed by the prospective
seller; whether the prospective buyer should or should not negotiate for al-
ternative conditions, terms, or provisions of sale; or whether the prospective
purchaser should or should not forego an attempt at consummating the
contemplated purchase. 265
Attorneys who perform searches of chains of title, who render opinions
of title, or who perform both on behalf of clients are bound by the tradi-
tional negligence standard of reasonable care and skill.266 Usually, reason-
able care and skill is deemed to be the level of care and skill possessed by
lawyers in the community in question. However, that does not mean that an
attorney will escape liability if the attorney adheres to a customary level of
care and skill that is below a minimal standard of reasonableness. 267
263. RUFFORD G. PATTON & CARROLL G. PATRON, PATTON ON TITLES 2d § 52 (West
1957).
264. 11 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 18, § 92.11 (b), at 219.
265. Id. at 218-20.
266. GOLDSTEIN & KORNGOLD, supra note 232, at 298 n.2.
267. Id. (citing Gleason v. Title Guar. Co., 300 F.2d 813, 813 (5th Cir. 1962)). In Gleason,
Title Guarantee sued an attorney that provided an opinion of title to the title company. Id. The
attorney certified that he had personally examined the relevant records. Id. at 814. The certifica-
tion was not true. Id. In fact, the attorney had relied upon information about the records that was
provided to the attorney over the telephone by a representative of the abstract company that had
performed the search of the records. Id. The attorney rendered an opinion that the title in ques-
tion was clear. Id. The title was not clear because it was encumbered by certain mortgages. Id.
The title company issued a policy of title insurance in reliance upon the representations made by
the attorney in the opinion that the attorney had rendered to the title company. The attorney de-
fended on the basis that the conduct of the attorney was in keeping with the local custom and
practice of obtaining information about land title records. Id. That defense was rejected. Id. The
courts held that the attorney could not be insulated from liability for a breach of the attorney's du-
ties regarding the rendering of an opinion of title based upon the attorney's adherence to a custom
and practice that is below the minimal standards of reasonable care and skill. Id.
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Disclaimers that purport to either excuse an attorney from certain types
of liability or that purport to limit an attorney's liability under a contract
between an attorney and the attorney's client that calls for the attorney to
perform a search of public land title records on behalf of the client might
not be prohibited by public policy. However, these types of disclaimers are
narrowly construed. 268 At least one court has ruled that if an attorney ex-
amining title receives information that would give the attorney a basis to
suspect that a defect exists, the attorney owes the client a duty of investiga-
tion that cannot be disclaimed. 269
The courts are divided on the issue of whether an attorney who has per-
formed a search of title records or has rendered a title opinion is or is not
liable to a person other than the client who retained the services of the at-
torney if the attorney failed to properly perform the search or failed to ren-
der a correct opinion. Circumstances that have given rise to questions of
whether an attorney is or is not liable to third parties (i.e., persons who are
not a client of the attorney) include:
(1) claims for damages brought by a mortgagor against attorneys for the
mortgagee based upon the mortgagor's reliance upon a title search per-
formed or a title opinion rendered by an attorney for the mortgagee,
(2) claims for damages brought by mortgagees against attorneys retained
by mortgagors based upon a mortgagees reliance upon a title search per-
formed or a title opinion rendered by an attorney retained by the mortga-
gor,270 and
268. GOLDSTEIN & KORNGOLD, supra note 232, at 298 n.3.
269. E.g., Owen v. Neely, 471 S.W.2d 705, 708 (Ky. 1971).
270. See, e.g., Page v. Frazier, 445 N.E.2d 148 (Mass. 1983). In Page, the plaintiffs sued the
lender's attorney on the theory that the attorney was liable to the plaintiffs because of negligent
misrepresentation. Id. at 149. The trial court dismissed the complaint. Id. The Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts granted plaintiffs' motion for direct appellate review. Id. Thereafter, the
supreme judicial court affirmed the trial court's judgment of dismissal. Id. The supreme judicial
court based its affirmation of the lower court's judgment of dismissal upon exculpatory language
in the loan application that warned the plaintiffs against relying upon opinions rendered by the
bank's counsel even though the plaintiffs would be billed for and be responsible for paying the
fees that arose from the services rendered by the bank's attorney on behalf of the bank. Id. at 149-
50, 154. The loan application also contained a provision that preserved the right of the buyers to
retain counsel, at their expense, to represent the interests of the buyers in the subject transaction.
Id. As a consequence, the court held that any reliance that the buyers placed upon the content of
the opinion rendered by the bank's attorney to the bank was not reasonable. Id. at 154-55. The
supreme judicial court affirmed the holding of the trial court that the attorney was not liable to the
buyers under contract law because there was no privity of contract between the attorney and the
buyers. Id. at 152-53. The court also affirmed the finding of the trial court that the attorney was
acting in the capacity of an independent contractor. Id. at 151. Consequently, the attorney's er-
rors could not be imputed to the bank under the agency theory of respondeat superior. Cf. In re
Lanza, 322 A.2d 445 (N.J. 1974) (wherein the attorney represented two parties with conflicting
interests); see also Westport Bank & Trust Co. v. Corcoran, Mallin & Aresco, 605 A.2d 862
(Conn. 1992). In the Westport Bank case, the mortgagee sent a letter to the attorneys for the mort-
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(3) claims for damages brought by buyers against attorneys who were re-
tained by the sellers and vice versa. 271
In many sectors of the United States, a large number of persons who
obtain or receive an interest in real property also obtain or receive assur-
ances of title in the form of a policy of title insurance.272 A person who ac-
quires an interest in real property is likely to rely upon title insurance as a
form of title assurance notwithstanding that the person might also be pro-
tected under other forms of title assurances as well.
F. TITLE INSURANCE
The business of title insurance began in the United States. 273 The first
enterprise to engage in the business of insuring interests in real property
started in Philadelphia in 1853.274 Statutory law enabling title insurance
companies to be incorporated was first enacted in Pennsylvania in 1874.275
Many authorities point to the decision in Watson v. Muirhead276 as being
the watershed for that legislation. 277 Very little title insurance is written re-
gagors requesting that the attorneys provide a title search to the mortgagee. Id. at 862-63. The
attorneys complied with the consent of the mortgagors. Id. at 863. The court held that the attor-
neys had taken on a dual representation. Id. at 865. Thus, the mortgagee and the attorneys were
in privity of contract and the court held that plaintiffs had stated a justiciable cause of action that
the attorneys were liable to the mortgagee for failure to perform a proper search. Id. As a conse-
quence, the supreme court reversed the judgment of dismissal that had been entered by the trial
court based on its grant of defendants' motion to strike plaintiffs' complaint and remanded the
cause for further proceedings. Id.
271. See, e.g., Century 21 Deep South Properties, Ltd. v. Corson, 612 So.2d 359 (Miss.
1992). In the Corson case, the buyers sued the sellers' attorney for malpractice. Id. at 372. The
buyers claimed the attorney was liable for title defects that the attorney failed to discover when the
attorney represented the sellers at the time that sellers purchased the property. Id. at 363. The
attorney defended on the grounds that the buyers lacked contract privity and were therefore barred
from pursuing their claim against the attorney. Id. at 372. The Supreme Court of Mississippi re-
jected the attorney's defense. Id. at 374. In so doing, the court held that an attorney performing
title work will be liable to reasonably foreseeable persons who, for a proper business purpose, det-
rimentally rely on the attorney's title work and who suffer loss that is proximately caused by the
attorney's negligence. Id. at 374. Although the buyers were deemed to have stated a cause of ac-
tion against the attorney, they did not prevail in their prosecution of the cause of action because
they were not able to prove that they had suffered damages that were proximately caused by the
failures of the attorney for the sellers. Id. at 374.
272. LEFCOE, supra note 22, at 255.
273. Id. at 259.
274. Sumner B. Young, et al., Report of the Special Committee of the Hennepin County Bar
Association Appointed to Study Title Insurance, 19 MINN. L. REV. 354, 357 (1935); see also
LEFCOE, supra note 22, at 260 n. 14 (identifying that company as being the "Law Property Assur-
ance and Trust Society").
275. Young, supra note 274, at 357.
276. 57 Pa. 161 (1868).
277. LEFCOE, supra note 22, at 259; see also BURCHETT, supra note 216, § 1.1.
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garding properties that are located in jurisdictions outside of the United
States. 278
Title insurance has become the dominant form of title assurance in
most of the United States. 279 There are states in which title insurance has
replaced abstracts of title and attorney's opinions of title as the only form of
title assurance that is relied upon in addition to or in lieu of contract cove-
nants or warranties of title, deed covenants or warranties of title, or both.
Beginning in 1948, some states have implemented state administered title
guaranty programs. 280 The purpose of these guaranty programs is to pre-
serve the role of private attorneys in examining titles and issuing title opin-
ions. 281 Such guaranty programs are designed to exist in harmony with the
business of title insurance as opposed to replacing it.282
There is a national organization of title insurance companies known as
the American Land Title Association (ALTA).283 Local organizations of
title insurance companies exist in a few areas of the country. The largest
local organizations exist in California (CLTA), Texas, and New York.284
One of the purposes for which these organizations exist is the promulgation
of boilerplate forms for the various types of title insurance policies that are
issued by or on behalf of title insurance companies. 285 Some policies pri-
marily protect the person insured against defects in title disclosed by the
public records. 286 By contrast, other forms of policies protect the insured
person against defects disclosed by the public records, inspections, surveys,
or by making inquiry of parties in possession.287 All policies of title insur-
ance protect against certain "hidden" risks.288
Many commentators regard the phrase "title insurance" as being close
to a misnomer.289 The act of insuring is usually associated with the concept
of an insurer taking on risks concerning circumstances or events that might
278. Id.
279. Id. at 215.
280. PAUL E. BAYSE, CLEARING LAND TITLES § 3, at 15 (2d ed. 1970); see also Michael J.
Rooney, Bar Related Title Insurance, 1980 SO. ILL. L.J. 263 (1980).
281. MARLIN M. VOLZ, JR., 1 IOWA PRACTICE § 8.22 (3rd ed. 1996).
282. Id.
283. 11 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 18, § 93.01, at 231-32.
284. Id. at 232.
285. Id.
286. See, e.g., Lick Mill Creek Apts. v. Chicago Title Ins. Co., 231 Cal. Rptr. 231, 233 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1991). During my tenure as legal counsel for title insurance companies, it was the custom
and practice in the industry to refer to those types of polices as "standard coverage policies."
287. Id. During my tenure as legal counsel for title insurance companies, it was the custom
and practice in the industry to refer to those types of policies as "extended coverage policies."
288. 11 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 18, § 93.02(a), at 233 n.43.
289. Id. § 93.01, at 226.
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occur subsequent to the time at which the insurance policy became effec-
tive. 290 In contrast, title insurance involves a process by which title insurers
assume risks regarding circumstances or events that have occurred prior to
the effective date and time of the policy of title insurance.
291
Modem policies of title insurance do not include an assurance that a
defect in title does not exist. 292 In essence, a modern policy of title insur-
ance is a promise by the insurer to the insured that if title is not in the con-
dition evidenced by the terms and provisions of the policy, the insurer will
protect the insured against or reimburse the insured for loss or damage
caused by the defect in the title.293
Certain types of industry forms of title insurance contain provisions
that describe each of those policies as being a contract of indemnity. 294 The
prevailing trend of courts is to regard a modern policy of title insurance as
being a type of contract of indemnity. 295 Treating policies of title insurance
as contracts of indemnity is consistent with the notion that a policy of title
insurance is not an abstract of title. The notion that a policy of title insur-
ance is not an abstract of title was codified in California effective January 1,
1982.296
In general, policies of title insurance are the product of a risk identifi-
cation, risk elimination, or risk reduction process. 297 Although title insurers
generally fulfill a role in the risk identification, risk elimination, or risk re-
duction process, there is a split of authority as to whether a title insurer has
a duty to issue policies based on an examination of title records. 298 If a title
290. Id. at 232-33.
291. Id.; see also 16 RICHARD R. POWELL & PATRICK J. ROHAN, POWELL ON REAL
PROPERTY § 92.01[3][b], at 92-9 (Michael A. Wolf ed., 2000).
292. Id. §92.01[1], at 92-6.
293. OLIN L. BROWDER, ET AL., BASIC PROPERTY LAW 862 (5th ed. 1989).
294. Id. at 870 (citing T 7 of the "Conditions and Stipulations" of an ALTA owner's policy
which reads: "This policy is a contract of indemnity against actual monetary loss or damage sus-
tained or incurred by the insured claimant who has suffered loss or damage by reason of matters
insured against by this policy and only to the extent herein described"). The same provision is
included in T 7 of the "Conditions and Stipulations" of an ALTA lender's policy and a CLTA
standard coverage policy. Id.
295. See, e.g., Sattler v. Philadelphia Title Ins. Co., 162 A.2d 22, 24 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1960);
Contini v. Western Title Ins. Co., 115 Cal. Rptr. 257, 261 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974); L. Smirlock Re-
alty Corp. v. Title Guarantee Co., 418 N.E.2d 650, 653 (N.Y. 1981).
296. CAL. INS. CODE § 12340.10 (1988).
297. Quinton Johnstone, Title Insurance, 66 YALE L.J. 492, 516 (1957); see also Joyce D.
Palomar, Bank Control of Title Insurance Companies: Perils to the Public that Bank Regulators
Have Ignored, 44 SW. L.J. 905, 937-41 (1990) (discussing the discourse on the social utility of a
title insurer's role regarding the elimination or reduction of risks in real property transactions and
how that role might be compromised if a title insurance company is under the control of a lender).
298. Note: Title Insurance, The Duty to Search, 71 YALE L.J. 1161, 1177 (1961-62); see also
Michael M. Rooney, Title Insurance: A Primer for Attorneys, 14 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 608,
610-12 (1979).
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insurer is not under a duty to issue policies based on the examination of title
records, it behooves the title insurer to comply with such an underwriting
practice on a self-imposed basis. 299 The purpose of such a self-imposed un-
derwriting practice is to avoid the reduction in profits that the insurer expe-
riences when a loss is paid pursuant to the terms and provisions of a pol-
icy.300 Jurisdictions that do not impose a duty upon title insurers to
examine title records are apt to adhere to the notion that abstractor's liabil-
ity does not attach to the issuance of a policy of title insurance. 30' Put an-
other way, if there is a self-imposed duty to search title records imple-
mented by a title insurer as part of its internal underwriting practices, the
duty is owed by the title insurer to itself for its own protection and not to
the insured or any other party.302 In that type of jurisdiction, a duty to
search would be enforceable against the title insurer by the insured only if
the insurer assumes such a duty pursuant to an express or implied provision
in the policy of title insurance. 303
Title insurance is regarded as "an effective means of shifting and
spreading both known and unknown title risks." 304 Some commentators
point to that concept as being the foundation upon which a one-time pre-
mium is paid for the issuance of a policy of title insurance. Of course, the
degree to which a title insurer is able to spread risks and losses has limita-
tions.305
Unlike other forms of insurance, title insurance is not in effect for a
calculable term. Also, unlike other forms of insurance, title insurance does
not involve a process whereby an insured is required to seek renewal of
coverage at calculable intervals of time that involve the payment of a new
premium. 306 Title insurance is designed to remain in force for the benefit of
the original insured and certain classes of successors-in-interest of the in-
sured, so long as the circumstances under which a person constitutes an "in-
sured" under the terms, provisions, conditions, and stipulations of the policy
of title insurance continue to exist.307 Anecdotally speaking, many legal
299. Rooney, supra note 298, at 610-12.
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. E.g., Horn v. Lawyers' Title Ins. Co., 557 P.2d 206, 208 (N.M. 1976); Wolff v. Com-
mercial Standard Ins. Co., 345 S.W.2d 565 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961); Transamerica Title Ins. Co. v.
Johnson, 693 P.2d 697, 700 (Wash. 1985).
303. See, e.g., Horn, 557 P.2d at 208; Culp Constr. Co. v. Buildmart Mall, 795 P.2d 650, 653
(Utah 1990).
304. 11 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 18, §93.01, at 225.
305. Id. at 226.
306. 16 POWELL, supra note 291, § 92.14, at 92-61 to -65.
307. Id.
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practitioners and jurists overlook the significance of the premium structure
for the acquisition and issuance of policies of title insurance, especially re-
garding the resolution of issues that pertain to the manner in which a policy
provision should be construed or interpreted. The one-time premium
structure ought to be a factor when the issue of how a policy provision
should or should not be construed or interpreted is put before a court of
competent jurisdiction. 308 It appears axiomatic that the one-time premium
payment and the amount thereof should have a bearing upon whether a
claimed expectation of an insured or an insurer is or is not reasonable.
309
A policy of title insurance can be looked upon as being comprised of
four components. The first component is comprised of the coverage provi-
sions. 310 The second component is the policy conditions and stipulations.311
The third component is those matters that are routinely excluded from pol-
icy coverage by virtue of the printed exclusions from coverage. 312 The
fourth component is those matters that are specifically excepted from policy
coverage.313 Taken together, the third and fourth components comprise
those matters against which the insurer does not protect the insured.314
We turn to a focus upon the question of whether a person who assures a
quality of title to an interest in real property is or is not liable for a defect in
that title which is the result of conduct on the part of the assured.
III. IS A PERSON WHO ASSURES A QUALITY OF TITLE TO REAL
PROPERTY LIABLE FOR A DEFECT IN THE TITLE CAUSED BY
CONDUCT ON THE PART OF AN ASSURED?
The commentary that follows explores legal principles or theories upon
which a person who assures a quality of title might be insulated from liabil-
ity for a defect in the title caused by conduct on the part of an assured, and
it also explores legal principles or theories upon which a person who as-
308. 11 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 18, § 93.02(a), at 233.
309. Id.
310. Cf. 11 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 18, § 93.02(c), at 234 (describing a
policy of title insurance as being comprised of six parts). The list set forth in the cited authority
treats two segments of a policy regarding coverage as separate and distinct parts. Id. In contrast,
the body of this article refers to those two parts of a policy as a single component regarding cover-
age. Similarly, the list set forth in the cited authority treats the two parts of preprinted exclusions
from policy coverage that appear in many policy forms as being two separate and distinct parts to
a policy. Id. The body of this article refers to those two parts of a policy as a single component
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sures a quality of title might be liable notwithstanding that the defect in
question was caused by conduct on the part of the assured.
A. CONTRACT COVENANTS OR WARRANTIES OF TITLE
In the United States, a seller of an interest in real property does not
have a duty to prove the seller's title unless the seller has undertaken such a
duty under the express or implied terms and provisions of a contract. 315 A
seller might agree that the purchaser has a right to cause the contract of sale
to be rescinded in the event that liens resulting from conduct on the part of
the purchaser would attach to the title conveyed to the purchaser by the
seller if the sale in question was consummated. 316 However, it is not cus-
tomary for that type of express provision to be included in a contract for the
sale of an interest in real property. Thus, the question at hand is likely to be
resolved by means of a construction or interpretation of a marketable title
provision that is customarily expressly or impliedly included as part of a
contract for the sale of an interest in real property.
315. PATTON, supra note 263, § 41.
316. Such an express provision might read:
Title is to be free of encumbrances of record or known to Seller, other than (a) current
property taxes, (b) conditions, covenants, restrictions, and public utility easements
(provided they do not adversely affect the Property's current use), and (c) items ap-
proved by Purchaser. Purchaser may object in writing, within five (5) calendar days of
receipt of a Preliminary Report, or any supplement thereto, to exceptions contained in
the report or any supplement to the report. Seller warrants that there is no recorded
Notice of Default outstanding against the Property. Title shall be conveyed to Pur-
chaser, insurable by the title policy specified in Section 4 of this contract. If seller is
unable or unwilling to convey title as stated, Purchaser may terminate this contract and
have all unused deposits returned, subject to Section 20(c) of this contract.
HARRY D. MILLER, I MILLER & STARR, CALIFORNIA REAL ESTATE FORMS 3D, § 1:51, at 11
(West Group 2000). Notwithstanding any provision in this contract to the contrary, Purchaser
may terminate this contract in the event that Purchaser becomes aware of the existence of a re-
corded abstract of judgment against Purchaser, or a recorded judgment lien against Purchaser,
or a recorded tax lien against Purchaser, or other matter recorded against Purchaser that will
become an encumbrance against the title to the subject real property if Purchaser completes the
purchase of that title from Seller. The non-italicized portion of the foregoing sample provision is
based upon the sample contract provision that appears in the above-cited authority. I have in-
cluded the italicized portion of the sample. The italicized portion is an example of a provision by
which a buyer might have an express right to rescind pursuant to the express terms and provisions
of a contract for the sale of an interest in real property under the circumstances described in the
enabling contract provision. I have not included any provision for the buyer to have a right to a
return of the buyer's earnest money deposit or other form of down payment. I believe that a seller
would agree that a buyer have such a right of rescission only if the buyer would agree that the
seller has the right to retain the earnest money deposit or other form of down payment. The
seller's retention of the earnest money deposit or other form of down payment would be designed
to compensate the seller for the loss of opportunity that the seller would likely suffer while the
property in question was "off the market" during the executory period of the contract rescinded by
the buyer under the above-described circumstances. 12 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra
note 13, § 99.05(c), at 236.
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1. Implied Covenants or Warranties of Marketable Title
In the United States, every contract for the sale of an interest in real
property includes a covenant by the seller to deliver marketable title to the
buyer. 317 Such a covenant can be expressly set forth in a contract of sale. If
the seller's covenant to deliver marketable title to the buyer is not expressly
set forth in the contract of sale, the inclusion of such a covenant in the con-
tract of sale is implied. 318 Professor Malloy and Professor Smith note:
Marketable title disputes arise in many different contexts. Courts
have used the term to address the merits of purchasers' objections
to all the following matters: defects in the record chain of title,
outstanding possessory rights, future interests, mortgages, liens,
easements, real covenants and equitable servitudes, zoning ordi-
nances and other land use regulations, eminent domain, adverse
possession claims, boundary disputes, encroachment of improve-
ments, and access to land. With such a tremendous variety of fact
situations, it is not surprising that judicial definitions of marketable
title are often opaque and sometimes circular.
319
Regardless of the degree of clarity of a particular judicial definition of
marketable title, a clear and common thread exists between all current judi-
cial definitions of an implied promise by a seller to deliver marketable title
to a buyer. That common thread is that each judicial definition pertains to a
state of title owned by the seller up to the time immediately prior to the ten-
der of delivery of that title from the seller to the buyer.320 It follows that
encumbrances that attach to the title upon or after the seller's delivery of
title to the buyer are matters that are beyond the scope of the seller's im-
plied promise to tender a marketable title to the buyer. Authorities note that
the essence of the seller's implied promise to deliver marketable title is a
promise that the seller's title is marketable. 32' It follows that abstracts of
judgment against the buyer, judgment liens against the buyer, and tax liens
against the buyer are not encumbrances against the title owned by the seller
prior to the moment at which the seller transferred that title to the buyer.
Consequently, those are not matters against which the seller is regarded as
having made an implied promise to protect the buyer. A buyer does not and
317. DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 5, at 579; see also LEFCOE, supra note 22, at 126.
318. Id.
319. ROBIN PAUL MALLOY & JAMES CHARLES SMITH, REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS
PROBLEMS, CASES AND MATERIALS 273-75 (2d ed. 2002) (setting forth a sampling of judicial
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should not have a right to cause a contract for the sale of an interest in real
property to be rescinded under such a set of circumstances. 322
Although a reacquisition of title to a parcel of real property by a previ-
ous owner of that title might be considered a rarity, transactions involving a
reacquisition of title do occur from time to time. It is possible that the
buyer created an encumbrance or some other cloud upon the title to a parcel
of real property at a time when the buyer was a prior owner of that title,
therefore, a predecessor-in-interest of the seller. The buyer can seek a re-
scission of the contract of sale claiming that an encumbrance, lien, or other
adverse claim is a defect in the seller's title that relieves the buyer of the
obligation to purchase notwithstanding that the "defect" was created by the
buyer. It appears that no reported case law exists concerning such a con-
tention on the part of a buyer. That being so, I offer observations regarding
the manner in which a buyer's claim would likely be resolved if such a
claim were put before a court of competent jurisdiction.
A contract for the sale of an interest in real property expressly or im-
pliedly includes a covenant by each party to the contract to deal fairly and
in good faith with every other party to the contract. 323 An attempt by a
buyer to rescind a contract of sale on the grounds that an encumbrance or
other adverse claim constitutes a defect in the seller's title notwithstanding
that the defect arose from conduct on the part of the buyer would likely give
rise to the question of whether such a course of action is a violation of the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing.3 24 A resolution of that issue would
likely depend upon whether the issue is adjudicated as a matter of law or a
matter of fact.325
If the issue is resolved through the judicial process as a matter of law, a
policy that a court would likely take into account is the preservation of the
sanctity of contracts.3 26 Under that approach, it is likely that a buyer would
not be allowed to complain about a burden that arose from conduct of the
buyer while the buyer was a prior owner of the title in question. As a mat-
ter of law, seeking to preserve the sanctity of the contract in question, a
court would probably conclude that there would not be any justification to
allow a buyer to complain about a quality of title that was previously owned
322. 11 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 18, § 96.15(a)(5), at 748-52.
323. Id. § 96.11(a), at 637 n.477 (citing Nafstad v. Merchant, 228 N.W.2d 548 (Minn.
1975)).
324. Id. § 96.15(a)(5), at 748-52.
325. Id.
326. Id. § 96.11(a), at 637 n.477 (citing Nafstad v. Merchant, 228 N.W.2d 548 (Minn.
1975)).
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by the buyer.327 A court would probably hold that the buyer is bound under
the terms and provisions of the contract to consummate the buyer's reacqui-
sition of the subject title. Put another way, it is likely that such a quality of
title would be deemed marketable. Hence, the seller would not be in breach
of the seller's implied covenant to deliver marketable title to the buyer.
However, if the issue of whether the buyer may cause the contract of
sale to be rescinded under the aforementioned circumstance is treated as a
question of fact, a court might take the following factors, among others, into
account: whether the purchase price is commensurate with a transfer of the
subject title free of the alleged defect, the time that has expired between the
creation of the "defect" and the time at which the buyer became aware or
should have become aware of the continuing existence of the encumbrance
or other adverse claim, and whether the encumbrance or other adverse claim
that is under scrutiny was the product of innocent or wrongful conduct on
the part of the buyer.328
To avoid the possibility of a buyer being able to cause the contract of
sale to be rescinded because of an encumbrance or adverse claim rendering
the seller's title as unmarketable notwithstanding that the buyer created the
"defect" as a predecessor-in-interest of the seller, the seller should negotiate
for and include a provision in the contract that precludes the buyer from
being able to rescind the contract due to matters created, suffered, assumed,
or agreed to by the buyer. 329 Of course, if a seller, presumably with the aid
of legal counsel, thinks to negotiate for such a contract provision, it is prob-
able that the seller will want such a provision to be included as part of an
express marketable title contract clause.330
A buyer and seller may agree to an express contract provision that de-
fines or refers to the quality of title that will constitute a marketable title for
purposes of their sale transaction in place of an implied adoption of a judi-
cial or statutory definition of marketable title.331 The most common types
of express contract provisions that serve the aforementioned purpose are
characterized as insurable title provisions, record title provisions, and title
subject to buyer's approval provisions. 332
327. 11 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 18, § 96.15(a)(5), at 748-52.
328. Id.
329. Id.
330. See supra notes 21-58 and accompanying text.
331. Id.
332. MALLOY & SMITH, supra note 319, at 275-79; see also LEFCOE, supra note 22, at 128-
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2. Express Covenants to Tender Insurable Title
An express promise on the part of a seller to tender "insurable title" to
a buyer can result in a title being tendered to the buyer that is equal in qual-
ity to that which constitutes marketable title under the controlling judicial
definition. 333 On the other hand, title that is insurable can differ in quality
from that which constitutes a marketable title under the controlling judicial
definition of marketable title.334
Insurable title can differ from title that constitutes marketable title as
determined by controlling decisional law in one of two ways. First, insur-
able title can differ from a judicial definition of marketable title where a ti-
tle insurer is not willing to assume a title risk that is considered under the
controlling decisional law as a matter that does not render title unmarket-
able. 335 In that situation, the contract standard of insurable title is narrower
in scope than the judicial definition of marketable title. 336 Second, market-
able title can differ from judicial marketable title where the contract stan-
dard of an insurable marketable title is broader in scope than the judicial
definition of marketable title.337 The contract standard is broader in scope
when a title insurer must assume the risk of a title matter that would render
the title unmarketable if the judicial definition of marketable title con-
trolled.338
Under customary "insurable title" contract clauses, a seller agrees to
deliver to a buyer a quality of title that an approved title insurer is willing to
insure for the benefit of the buyer. 339 Thus, if an approved title insurer is
333. MALLOY & SMITH, supra note 319, at 275-79.
334. Id.
335. Id.
336. See, e.g., Conklin v. Davi, 388 A.2d 598 (N.J. 1978). The sale contract before the court
in Conklin required the seller to deliver "marketable and insurable" title to the buyer. Id. at 601.
Although a title insurer was willing to insure the title seller tendered to buyer, the buyer rejected
the tender on the grounds that said title was not marketable because a portion of the title was
based on an unperfected claim of adverse possession. Id. at 600, 602. The New Jersey Supreme
Court held that title based on an unperfected claim of adverse possession is marketable as a matter
of law provided the seller can make a prima facia case for adverse possession. Id. at 601-03. If a
title insurer had not been willing to insure the title tendered by seller, the title would not have been
marketable under the terms of the contract even though such a title was marketable as a matter of
law. Id. at 601-02.
337. Id. at 601.
338. See, e.g., Howard v. Schaniel, 169 Cal. Rptr. 678, 682 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980). In the
Howard case, the seller's title was unmarketable because it was based on an unperfected claim of
adverse possession. Id. Based on the court's discussion in Howard, if a title insurer is willing to
insure title in the buyer that is based on an unperfected claim of adverse possession, the buyer will
not have grounds to rescind because the seller's title is marketable under the marketable title
clause agreed to by the buyer. 12 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 13, §§ 99.01-.03,
at 227-34.
339. Supra note 34 and accompanying text.
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willing to issue a policy of title insurance to the buyer pursuant to the terms
and provisions of the contract of sale, the buyer is under an obligation to
accept the seller's tender of that title. 340 For example, if the policy of title
insurance required by an "insurable title" contract clause excludes or ex-
cepts a general lien 341 recorded against the buyer or a specific lien, encum-
brance, or adverse claim 342 previously created by the buyer while the buyer
was a predecessor-in-interest to the seller, the "insurable title" criteria
specified under the terms of the contract in question will have been met.343
As a consequence, the buyer will not have grounds to successfully claim
that the seller has breached the marketable title clause of the subject con-
tract. Thus, the buyer cannot cause the contract to be rescinded based on
the quality of the title tendered to the buyer by the seller.
3. Express Covenants to Tender Record Title
A contract clause pursuant to which a seller agrees to transfer "record
title" to a buyer might give rise to the question whether the seller's title can
be based upon an unrecorded deed, a will that is yet to be probated, or an
unperfected claim of title by adverse possession.344 The states are split on
the question of whether a seller's title that is based on an unperfected claim
of adverse possession 345 is or is not marketable under an implied marketable
title provision of a contract for the sale of an interest in real property. 346 A
number of states deem title based on an unperfected claim of adverse pos-
session as being unmarketable. 347 In the other group of states, title based on
an unperfected claim of adverse possession is deemed marketable. 348 In the
latter group of states, a buyer can be compelled to accept the tender of title
by a seller where the seller establishes a prima facie case for adverse pos-
session. 349
One of the means by which a buyer can avoid being obligated to accept
title based on an unperfected claim of adverse possession in the latter group
of states is by negotiating for the inclusion of a marketable title clause in
340. In Conklin, the approved title insurer is described in the contract in question as "any
reputable title insurance company licensed to do business in the State of New Jersey." Conklin v.
Davi, 388 A.2d 598, 601 (N.J. 1977).
341. 16 POWELL, supra note 291, § 92.03[2][a], at 92-27.
342. 11 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 18, § 92.04(b), at 10 1-04.
343. See Conklin, 388 A.2d at 601.
344. LEFCOE, supra note 22, at 129.
345. 10 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 14, §§ 87.01-.19, 71-204.
346. LEFCOE, supra note 22, at 129.
347. Id. (citing Howard v. Schaniel, 169 Cal. Rptr. 678 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980).
348. See, e.g., Conklin, 388 A.2d at 601.
349. Id.
[VOL. 79:31 1
ASSURANCES OF TITLES TO REAL PROPERTY
the contract of sale that requires the seller to tender "record title" to the
buyer.350 Title based on an unperfected claim of adverse possession is not a
"record title" because a certified copy of a decree, whereby the claim of ad-
verse possession is perfected and the title based thereon confirmed, is yet to
be obtained and recorded by the seller or a successor-in-interest to the
seller.351
It is axiomatic that encumbrances, liens, or adverse claims of record
that were created by the buyer as a predecessor-in-interest of the seller do
not render the seller's record title as being unmarketable. Suppose, how-
ever, that a buyer asserts that a seller is not able to tender a "record title" as
required by the contract of sale because an unbroken, record chain of title in
the seller does not exist. 352 Also suppose that the "break" in the record
chain of title in question was caused by conduct on the part of the buyer.
When a "break" in the record chain of title is the result of conduct on
the part of a buyer, the seller should be able to successfully assert the af-
firmative defense of unclean hands353 against the buyer's attempt to gain
equitable relief in the form of a rescission of the contract notwithstanding
that it appears that such a set of circumstances has not been the subject of
any reported case.354 The seller should also be able to avert the buyer's
claim based on a cross-claim against the buyer that the buyer is in breach of
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, which is part of every
contract for the sale of an interest in real property. 355 It follows that the
seller should be able to obtain a decree on a cross-claim for specific per-
formance against the buyer provided that a valid, enforceable contract of
sale exists between the seller and buyer and the seller has not expressly
agreed to suffer the consequences of the existence of the "break" in the re-
cord chain of title caused by conduct of the buyer.
General liens recorded against the buyer are not part of the seller's re-
cord title. Consequently, a buyer would not have grounds to successfully
assert that the presence of recorded general liens against the buyer render
the seller's record title unmarketable.
350. See supra note 346 and accompanying text.
351. 10 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 14, § 87.16, at 185.
352. 11 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 18, § 92.05(a)(4), at 114; DUKEMINIER
& KRIER, supra note 5, at 560-62, 666, 695-96.
353. See Annotation, He who comes into equity must come with clean hands, 4 A.L.R. 44
(1919) (regarding the doctrine of unclean hands in general).
354. See Andrea G. Nadel, Annotation, Necessity of Real-Estate Purchaser's Election Be-
tween Remedy of Rescission and Remedy of Damages for Fraud, 40 A.L.R.4th 627 (1985) (re-
garding general application of the doctrine of rescission to real estate contracts); Annotation, Ex-
amination of real property by purchaser before entering into contract as precluding rescission on
ground of falsity of representation, 70 A.L.R. 942 (1931).
355. 11 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 18, § 96.1 l(a), at 637 n.477.
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4. Express Covenant to Tender Title Subject to Buyer's Approval
In his text on real estate transactions, Professor Lefcoe writes:
Most buyers prefer when the title standard is subject to the buyer's
satisfaction. This doesn't mean the buyer can be arbitrary. If it did,
such a standard could make the contract unenforceable as illusory.
Instead, some courts impose an objective standard - what a rea-
sonable buyer would require. Other courts allow the buyer a de-
gree of subjectivity but limit the buyer's discretion by invoking the
familiar concepts of good faith and fair dealing. Thus, even under
the "satisfactory to the buyer" standard, the buyer can't escape a
contract when there is nothing really objectionable about the title
(emphasis in original).
356
Applying the objective standard referred to in the above-quoted com-
ments of Professor Lefcoe gives rise to the question of whether a reasonable
buyer would require a seller to undertake the costs of curing a defect in the
seller's title caused by the action or inaction of the buyer.357 If the reason-
ableness or unreasonableness of a buyer's demands are determined by the
subjective standard described by Professor Lefcoe, the question is whether a
buyer is acting within the scope of the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing, to which all parties to a contract are bound, if the buyer seeks
to hold the seller responsible for a defect in the seller's title caused by con-
duct on the part of the buyer.358 Absent a specific agreement on the part of
the seller to the contrary, the buyer should be deemed to be acting unrea-
sonably or in a manner that is a breach of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing if a buyer attempts to force responsibility for a defect
in title caused by the buyer upon the seller.359 To resolve such an issue in
favor of the buyer when the seller has not expressly agreed to assume the
consequences of the buyer's conduct arguably would result in an unjustified
windfall to the buyer.360
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B. CAN A TRANSFEROR UNDER A WARRANTY DEED BE LIABLE FOR
TITLE DEFECTS THAT ARE THE PRODUCT OF CONDUCT ON
THE PART OF THE TRANSFEREE?
When covenants or warranties of title are expressly or impliedly part of
a deed, the deed may be referred to as a warranty deed.361 Thus, the term
"warranty deed" does not pertain to quitclaim deeds because no express or
implied covenant or warranty of title attaches to a quitclaim deed. 362
Upon delivery of a general warranty deed by a transferor to a trans-
feree, the transferor warrants against title defects that have arisen either by
conduct on the part of the transferor or by conduct on the part of a prede-
cessor-in-interest of the transferor.363 A bargain and sale deed "with full
covenants" is the functional equivalent of a general warranty deed.364 In
contrast, when a transferor delivers a special warranty deed to a transferee,
the transferor warrants against only those title defects that arise from con-
duct on the part of the transferor. 365 A bargain and sale deed that contains
covenants or warranties against defects arising from the conduct of the
transferor only is considered as being the functional equivalent of a special
warranty deed.366 A grant deed can be considered as the functional equiva-
lent of a special warranty deed. 367 Consequently, the issue at hand will be
considered in two segments. The first segment is an assessment of the
question under circumstances where a general warranty deed or its func-
tional equivalent is transferred to a transferee. The second segment is an
assessment of the question under circumstances where a special warranty
deed, or its functional equivalent, was transferred to a transferee.
1. General Warranty Deeds
The issue presently under assessment must be answered in the negative
when a transferee under a general warranty deed is not a predecessor-in-
interest of the transferor. This conclusion is so because any defect in title
that would exist as the result of conduct on the part of the transferee would
be beyond the scope of the transferor's deed covenants or warranties. 368
However, a closer examination of the instant question is necessary when a
transferee under a general warranty deed is also a predecessor-in-interest of
361. 11 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 18, § 94.07(a)-(b)(2)(i), at 386-92.
362. Id.
363. 14 POWELL, supra note 8, § 81A.03[l][b], at 81A-27 to -29.
364. 11 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 18, § 94.07(b)(1)(iii), at 389-90.
365. Id. § 94.07(b)(2)(i), at 390-92.
366. 14 POWELL, supra note 8, § 81A.03[i][b][iii], at 81A-28 to -29.
367. LEFCOE, supra note 12, at 177-79.
368. 14 POWELL, supra note 8, § 81A.03[I][b], at 81A-27 to -29.
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the transferor because it is possible that the warranties of title made by the
transferee when that person was acting in the capacity of a prior transferor
are enforceable against that transferee by the immediate transferor. 369 At
least two factors come to mind that would likely be taken into account by
any court of competent jurisdiction that is called upon to adjudicate the in-
stant question. These factors are actual or constructive knowledge of the
transferee of the continuing existence of the encumbrance previously cre-
ated by the transferee and whether the transferor is a person protected by
any prior covenant or warranty of title made by the transferee. 370
a. Transferee's Knowledge of the Defect
The transferee under a general warranty deed might have expressly
created the title defect during the transferee's prior ownership of the prop-
erty in question. 37' An example is where the transferee granted a right of
use of the property to another person in the nature of an express easement.
Without question, the transferee had knowledge of the creation of the ease-
ment. However, it is not a foregone conclusion that the transferee has ac-
tual knowledge of the current status of the easement. If the owner of the
easement right has never used it and if that mere nonuse does not constitute
an abandonment of the easement then the transferee should not be charged
with constructive knowledge of the continuing existence of the easement.
Suppose that no reference to that easement appears in any of the title infor-
mation provided to the transferee prior to the delivery of the general war-
ranty deed by the transferor, and its existence is not evident from any rea-
sonable inspection of the servient tenement. Also suppose that the
transferee is regarded as having acted reasonably in relying upon the title
information provided to the transferee, and upon the results of the inspec-
tion of the property in question. Further suppose that the transferee acted
reasonably in formulating the understanding that the easement that had been
previously created by the transferee does not exist any longer. Should the
transferor be liable to the transferee for a breach of the covenant or war-
ranty against encumbrances? May an insulation of the transferor from such
liability be justified?
There is conflict among the authorities as to whether a transferor can or
cannot defend a claim of breach of a warranty against encumbrances that
369. Id.
370. Supra notes 98-128 and accompanying text.
371. See DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 5, at 211 (regarding the "bundle of rights" the-
ory to which some scholars and practitioners adhere regarding ownership of property that include
the rights of property owner to encumber or hypothecate property).
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affect the title to the property in question based on the mere fact that the
transferee had knowledge of the encumbrance prior to or at the close of the
transaction. 372 The transferee's knowledge of the prior creation of the "de-
fect" might be the reason for the transferee having negotiated for the deliv-
ery of a general warranty from the transferor to the transferee. 373 It is one
thing to have knowledge about the creation of an encumbrance, but it is an-
other thing to desire and receive an assurance that the encumbrance in
question is no longer a burden against the subject property. 374 If the trans-
feree has not breached the same type of covenant or warranty of title that is
enforceable against the transferee by the transferor, there does not appear to
be any compelling reason why a transferee who had actual knowledge about
the creation of an encumbrance should not be able to rely upon, and receive
the benefit of, a transferor's covenant or warranty to the effect that the prior
encumbrance ceased to exist and did not encumber the property in question
as of the time of the delivery of the general warranty deed. 375
A transferor under a general warranty deed can limit the scope of li-
ability that would otherwise apply to the standard forms of covenants or
warranties that attach to such a deed. 376 To avoid being liable to the trans-
feree under this type of circumstance, the transferor can expressly exclude
"defects" caused by conduct on the part of the transferee from the scope of
liability undertaken by the transferor in connection with the transferor's de-
livery of a general warranty deed to the transferee. 377 There does not ap-
pear to be any compelling public policy that would prevent a transferor
from being insulated from liability based on such an exclusion being in-
cluded as part of the deed provisions. 378
Some jurisdictions adhere to the rule that a transferor under a warranty
deed is not liable for an alleged breach of the warranty against encum-
brances when the transferee had knowledge of the encumbrance in question
at the time when the transferor delivered the deed to the transferee. 379 Ap-
parently, this view is applicable regardless of whether the defect of which
the transferee had knowledge was created by conduct on the part of the
372. Id. at 619-20 (quoting Jones v. Grow Inv. & Mortgage Co., 358 P.2d 909, 910-11 (Utah
1961)); see also 20 AM. JUR. 2D Covenants, Etc. §§ 83-89 (1995).
373. LEFCOE, supra note 22, at 176.
374. Id.
375. Id.




379. 20 AM. JUR. 2D Covenants, Etc. § 77 (1995).
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transferee. 380 It appears that the knowledge of the transferee is regarded as
a manifestation of intent on the part of the transferee that the encumbrance
in question was acceptable to the transferee. 38' It follows that if the trans-
feree did not want to accept title to the property in question that is clouded
or encumbered by the "defect," the transferee should not have allowed the
transaction to close until the "defect" was removed or other arrangements
satisfactory to the transferee put into effect. 382
b. The Effect of a Transferee's Liability as a Remote
Transferor
The common-law rule is that a breach of a present deed covenant or
warranty of title "does not run with the land." 383 Under the common law, a
transferee would not have any liability as a remote transferor to the imme-
diate transferor because the chose-in-action that arises from a breach of a
present deed covenant or warranty of title is not assignable. 384 It follows
that the right of enforcement under such a chose-in-action would not have
been assigned to or otherwise received by the immediate transferor of the
transferee. 385
Some states do not adhere to the common law prohibition against an
assignment of a chose-in-action. 386 A chose-in-action in the nature of a
breach of a deed covenant or warranty of seisin, right to convey, or against
encumbrances is assignable. 387 It is possible for an immediate transferor
under a general warranty deed to have previously acquired the right to en-
force a breach of a present deed covenant or warranty of title committed by
the immediate transferee under the transferor's warranty deed when the
immediate transferee previously transferred title to the property in question
by means of a warranty deed.388 Arguably, the immediate transferee's li-
ability under such a set of circumstances would be either a complete bar to
or a set-off against a claim by the transferee that the transferor is liable to
380. Id.
381. Id.
382. For example, the transferor might agree to hold the transferee harmless and indemnify
the transferee against loss or damage that the transferee might otherwise sustain due to the exis-
tence of the "defect" in title-the encumbrance in question.
383. Supra notes 108-15 and accompanying text.
384. Rockafellor v. Gray, 191 N.W. 107, 108 (Iowa 1922).
385. Supra notes 108-15 and accompanying text.
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the immediate transferee for the immediate transferor's breach of a present
deed covenant or warranty of title.389
The transferor should not be liable to the transferee under such a cir-
cumstance because the covenants or warranties that attach to the warranty
deed delivered by the transferor to the transferee should not be construed as
constituting a waiver by the transferor of any liability that the transferee
might owe to the transferor. 390 For similar reasons, the transferor should
not be estopped from asserting that the immediate transferee is liable to the
immediate transferor instead of the situation being the other way around. 391
Of course, the foregoing proposition would be controlling only if the provi-
sions of the applicable statute of limitations do not bar the prosecution of
the claim of the immediate transferor against the immediate transferee.392
2. Special Warranty Deeds
Even if a transferee under a special warranty deed is a predecessor-in-
interest of the special warranty deed transferor, the transferor will not have
any liability to the transferee for defects in title that are the product of con-
duct on the part of the transferee. 393 There is limited liability because the
covenants or warranties of title expressly or impliedly made by the trans-
feror under a special warranty deed pertain only to conduct on the part of
the transferor and not any conduct on the part of any predecessor-in-interest
of the transferor. 394
C. CAN AN ABSTRACTOR BE LIABLE TO A PURCHASER FOR TITLE
DEFECTS THAT ARE THE PRODUCT OF CONDUCT ON THE
PART OF THE PURCHASER?
1. Contract Theory
An abstractor is under a contractual obligation to prepare an abstract of
title. 395 Traditionally, a person must be in privity of contract with the ab-
stractor in order to have standing to hold the abstractor liable for a failure to
389. Id.
390. 11 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 18, § 94.07(b)(2)(i), at 390-92.
391. Id. at 392.
392. 9 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 70, § 82.10(d), at 622-23.
393. 11 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 18, § 94.07(b)(2)(i), at 390-92.
394. Id.
395. CAL. INS. CODE § 12340.10 (West 1988); see also, e.g., Williams v. Polgar, 215
N.W.2d 149, 157 (Mich. 1974); First Am. Title Ins. Co. v. First Title Service, 457 So.2d 467, 472-
73 (Fla. 1984).
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perform a proper title search or for a failure to properly compile an abstract
of title.
396
A purchaser is in privity of contract with an abstractor if the pur-
chaser was the person who contracted with the abstractor for the latter to
compile an abstract of title or if the purchaser is a third party beneficiary of
a contract between the abstractor and the seller. 397 Duly recorded ease-
ments, liens, or other encumbrances voluntarily created by or against the
purchaser while a prior owner of the property are within the seller's record
chain of title. 398 Consequently, a contract between a purchaser and an ab-
stractor requiring the abstractor to prepare an abstract of the seller's record
chain of title imposes a contractual duty upon the abstractor to include ref-
erence to recorded easements, specific liens, or other such encumbrances
previously created by the purchaser. 399 A failure on the part of the abstrac-
tor to report any such item in the abstract of title issued to the purchaser
could expose the abstractor to liability. 400
The purchaser's knowledge of the creation of the omitted item can be a
bar against the purchaser holding the abstractor liable for a breach of the
abstractor's contractual obligation because reliance upon that omission by
the buyer might be unreasonable or unwarranted. A resolution of such an
issue is likely to be accomplished by an application of the rule that "there
must be real uncertainty or a difficulty of ascertainment" in order for the
matter to affect the marketability of the title tendered or transferred to the
purchaser.401 An application of that proposition would likely impose an
obligation on the part of the purchaser to submit an inquiry to the abstractor
and obtain a response to that inquiry as conditions precedent to the pur-
chaser being able to arguably place a reasonable reliance upon an abstract
of title that does not contain a summary of the omitted, recorded encum-
brance or other recorded matter previously created by conduct on the part of
the purchaser while a prior owner of the title in question.
An abstractor would not be liable for not including reference to general
liens recorded and indexed under the name of the buyer in the abstract of
title issued by the abstractor to the buyer if the contract between the ab-
stractor and the buyer does not require the abstractor to search for and re-
396. Supra notes 230-49 and accompanying text.
397. Williams, 215 N.W. at 157; First Am. Title Ins. Co., 457 So.2d at 472-73.
398. See DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 5, at 695-96 (defining the phrase "chain of ti-
tle").
399. Supra notes 230-49 and accompanying text.
400. Supra notes 227-35 and accompanying text.
401. PATTON, supra note 263, § 46.
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port such matters. 402 Of course, the opposite might be true if the abstractor
undertook the contractual duty to search for and report the existence of any
such general liens to the prospective buyer who contracted with the ab-
stractor.403 In the latter circumstance, the buyer is presumably interested in
knowing whether any such liens would attach to the title transferred to the
buyer if the buyer were to contract for and consummate the acquisition of
title to a particular parcel of real property from a prospective transferor.404
In some sectors of the United States where abstracts of title are in use,
prospective sellers contract for the issuance of an abstract of title as a matter
of custom and practice. 40 5 A prospective buyer is not in contract privity
with the abstractor in that type of a situation. As a consequence, a buyer
would not have standing to hold the abstractor liable for the abstractor's
failure to properly discharge the abstractor's duties if the traditional privity
requirement is controlling. 406 However, case law and statutory law exists
pursuant to which a buyer is either accorded the status of a third party bene-
ficiary of the contract between the abstractor and the seller or is deemed to
have standing to assert liability against the abstractor based on principles of
tort law. 407
Inasmuch as a contract between a prospective seller and an abstrac-
tor for the issuance of an abstract of title usually does not include the impo-
sition of an obligation on the abstractor to search for and report recorded
general liens against a prospective or potential buyer, a buyer normally
would not have a justifiable claim against an abstractor based on the fact
that general liens against the buyer are not included as matters affecting the
title described in accordance with the terms and provisions of the contract
between the abstractor and the seller.
If a defect in title is caused by wrongful conduct on the part of the
buyer, an abstractor should not be liable to the buyer if an abstract of title
upon which the buyer relies does not include a summary of that matter.408
Relieving the abstractor from liability for a defect caused by wrongful con-
duct on the part of the buyer will avoid the buyer receiving an undue wind-
fall from the buyer's wrongful conduct. 409 Holding the abstractor liable to
402. Supra note 235 and accompanying text.
403. Id.
404. 11 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 18, § 92.11 (a), at 216-18.
405. MALLOY & SMITH, supra note 319, at 423.
406. Supra notes 230-49 and accompanying text.
407. William B. Johnson, Annotation, Negligence In Preparing Abstract of Title as Ground
of Liability to One Other Than Person Ordering Abstract, 50 ALR4th 314 (1986); see also
PATTON, supra note 262, § 44, at 150-55.
408. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 407.
409. Id.
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the buyer under such a set of circumstances would run afoul of the basic
maxim that people cannot take advantage of or be benefited by their wrong-
ful conduct.410
2. Tort Theory
In some jurisdictions, the traditional requirement of contractual privity
has been circumvented by the courts of those jurisdictions allowing a pur-
chaser a tort claim against the abstractor because the abstractor knew that
the purchaser would rely on the content of the abstract. 411 It appears that
the prevalent tort theory in these jurisdictions is negligent misrepresenta-
tion.412 A person who is not in contractual privity with an abstractor and
who is attempting to hold the abstractor liable in tort for an alleged breach
of the abstractor's responsibilities must establish that either the abstractor
knew the complainant would rely on the abstract or that it was foreseeable
that the complaining party would rely upon the abstract of title.4 13 An adju-
dication of the issue of whether it was foreseeable that the complaining
party who is not in contractual privity with an abstractor would rely upon an
abstract of title issued by the abstractor is dependent upon a determination
of whether the reliance by the complaining party was reasonable or unrea-
sonable.4 14
3. Statutory Law
Some states have enacted statutes that enable specified classes of third
persons who are not in contractual privity with an abstractor to seek direct
relief against the abstractor for injuries suffered by the third party that are
the proximate result of the abstractor's failure to properly compile an ab-
stract of title. 415 It appears that those statutes do not include a provision that
precludes a third party from holding an abstractor liable for a title defect
caused by the conduct of the third party. 416 However, it is likely that a pur-
chaser whose conduct gave rise to a title defect omitted from an abstract of
title would be barred from holding the abstractor liable if the injuries suf-
fered by the complaining party are proved to be the proximate result of the
410. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3517 (West 1997).
411. See, e.g., Williams v. Polgar, 215 N.W.2d 149, 154-57 (Mich. 1974).
412. Supra note 242 and accompanying text; see also GOLDSTEIN & KORNGOLD, supra note
232, at 303-04.
413. See, e.g., Williams, 215 N.W.2d at 154-57.
414. Id.
415. Johnson, supra note 407, at 363-67.
416. Id.
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conduct of the complaining party and not any failure on the part of the ab-
stractor to properly compile the abstract of title.
D. CAN AN ATTORNEY BE LIABLE TO A PURCHASER FOR TITLE
DEFECTS THAT ARE THE PRODUCT OF CONDUCT ON THE PART
OF THE PURCHASER?
Attorneys, like abstractors, are liable for defects in their work prod-
uct.4 17 The language of assurance contained in opinions of title issued by
attorneys varies.4 18 Examples of such language include:
(1) "I am of the opinion that . . . there were no taxes or judgments, and
no liens of any kind or description against the said property, except-
ing . . "-419
(2) "The property described in SCHEDULE 'A' hereof is free and clear
from all interests, encumbrances, and defects of title and all other matters
whatsoever of record. . . impairing or adversely affecting the title to said
property, except the following: .. .";420 and
(3) "I find that on said date good title of record to said property was duly
vested in . . . free from encumbrances or defects, except as follows: . . .
."421
Typical boilerplate exclusions from the assurances provided by an at-
torney's title opinion include:
(1) rights or claims of parties in possession not shown of record,
(2) defects of title disclosed by an accurate survey,
(3) restrictions created by zoning and building laws and ordinances,
(4) mechanic's liens not shown by the public records,
(5) special assessments not shown by the public records, and
(6) rights of dower or curtesy of the spouse of the owner.422
It appears that the customary exclusions from the assurances provided
by an attorney's opinion of title do not include defects of title that are the
product of the conduct of the assured.423 Consequently, it seems that an at-
torney should include such an exclusion from the assurances provided by
the attorney for the purpose of an attempt at avoiding liability that might
otherwise arise from a claim that the attorney has rendered a faulty opin-
417. GOLDSTEIN & KORNGOLD, supra note 232, at 297 n.I.
418. IV AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 209, § 18.100, at 850-52.
419. Id. at 850.
420. Id. at 851.
421. Id. at 852.
422. Id. at 853.
423. Id.
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ion.424 Whether an item is or is not a defect depends upon the circum-
stances under which the item was created and the scope of the services re-
quired of the attorney.4 25
Whether an attorney is liable to a buyer who did not contract with the
attorney for the latter's issuance of a title opinion depends upon whether the
laws of the jurisdiction allow third-party claims by people who are not in
contractual privity with the attorney.4 26 An attorney would not be liable to
a buyer for losses proximately caused by a general lien against a buyer who
was never a prior owner of the subject property because such a general lien
would not be part of the seller's chain of title.4 27 A general lien against a
buyer would not constitute a lien against the seller's title unless the lien had
attached to the title that was transferred to the seller by the seller's trans-
feror and it continued to exist as an encumbrance against the seller's title.
4 28
It appears that an attorney would be liable to a buyer for a failure to in-
clude reference to a defect in title caused by willful or wrongful conduct on
the part of the buyer if the attorney is not relieved from such liability pursu-
ant to a principle of equity or a public policy.429 When a defect in title is
caused by wrongful conduct on the part of the buyer, an attorney should not
be liable to the buyer. Relieving the attorney from liability for a defect
caused by wrongful conduct on the part of the buyer will avoid the buyer
receiving an undue windfall from the buyer's wrongful conduct. Holding
the attorney liable to the buyer under such a set of circumstances would run
afoul of the basic maxim that a person cannot take advantage of or be bene-
fited by wrongful conduct on the part of the wrongdoer.
4 30
E. CAN A TITLE INSURER BE LIABLE FOR A DEFECT IN TITLE THAT IS
THE PRODUCT OF CONDUCT ON THE PART OF THE INSURED?
"Exclusions from Coverage" of an ALTA policy of title insurance
reads:
The following matters are expressly excluded from the coverage of
this policy and the Company will not pay loss or damage, costs,
attorneys' fees or expenses which arise by reason of:431
424. Supra note 419 and accompanying text.
425. Id.
426. Supra note 270 and accompanying text.
427. Supra note 399 and accompanying text.
428. Id.
429. 11 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 18, § 92.11 (b), at 219 n.575.
430. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3517 (2003).
431. BROWDER, supra note 293, at 865 (quoting ATLA form of policy of title insurance).
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3. Defects, liens, encumbrances, adverse claims or other matters:
(a) created, suffered, assumed or agreed to by the insured claim-
ant.432
"Exclusions from Coverage" of a California Land Title Association
form of policy currently reads:
The following matters are expressly excluded from the coverage of
this policy and the Company will not pay loss or damage, costs,
attorneys' fees or expenses which arise by reason of:
3. Defects, liens, encumbrances, adverse claims or other matters:
(a) whether or not recorded in the public records at Date of Pol-
icy, but created, suffered, assumed or agreed to by the insured
claimant. 33
The CLTA exclusion purports to specifically pertain to defects, liens,
encumbrances, adverse claims, or other matters regardless of whether they
are recorded or not in the public records.434 The ALTA exclusion does not
include the phrase "whether or not recorded in the public records." 435 As a
result, a title insurer under an ALTA form of policy of title insurance may
be liable for a recorded title matter created, suffered, assumed, or agreed to
by the insured where reference to the recorded title matter is not included in
the schedule of exceptions from policy coverage.4 36
Courts that have construed the foregoing exclusions from coverage
provided under the terms, provisions, conditions, and stipulations of a pol-
icy of title insurance appear to be in accord that defects in title that arise
from mere negligence, accidental conduct, or innocent conduct on the part
of the insured are not within the scope of these exclusions. 437 To come
within the scope of these exclusions, a defect must be the product of delib-
erate, dishonest, illegal, or inequitable conduct on the part of the insured.438
432. Id. at 866.
433. Id.
434. Id.
435. Id. at 865.
436. See, e.g., HARRY D. MILLER, 3 MILLER & STARR, CALIFORNIA REAL ESTATE 3rd, §
7:45, at 126 n.1, § 7:55 at 145 (West Group 2000).
437. Smith, supra note 10, at 516-21.
438. Id. at 520.
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Whether an abstract of judgment or judgment lien is excluded from
policy coverage depends upon whether the judgment against the insured
was the product of negligent or accidental conduct of the insured or the
product of deliberate, dishonest, illegal, or inequitable conduct on the part
of the insured.439 If the abstract of judgment is not an excluded matter, the
title insurance company would be liable to the extent provided under the
terms, provisions, conditions, and stipulations of the policy of title of insur-
ance for loss, damages, attorney's fees, or costs incurred by the insured that
are the proximate result of the "missed" abstract of judgment or judgment
lien.440 However, if the abstract of judgment or judgment lien is an ex-
cluded matter, the title insurer is not liable to the insured for any loss, dam-
ages, attorney's fees, or costs incurred by the insured that are the proximate
result of the abstract of judgment or judgment lien.
An insured need not have actual knowledge of an abstract of judgment
or judgment lien that has been recorded against the insured in order for the
exclusions from coverage to be effective.441 Adherence to a requirement of
knowledge on the part of the insured in all instances would render the pol-
icy provisions that are under review meaningless.an2 Requiring a "defect in
title" to be the product of deliberate, dishonest, illegal, or inequitable con-
duct of the insured in order for the defect to be excluded from coverage is
arguably keeping with the reasonable expectations of an insured on the one
hand while adhering to the public policy against people benefiting from
their wrongful conduct on the other hand.
IV. CONCLUSION
The protection afforded to persons under various forms of assurances
of title that comprise part of the law of real property that is in effect in the
United States are not without limits. Therefore, it behooves a person who is
contemplating the acquisition of an interest in real property to arrange for a
combination of the protections in force in the jurisdiction in which the sub-
ject real property is located. The achievement of that goal is likely to occur
only when the person who is contemplating the acquisition of an interest in
real property has retained the services of an attorney with respect to that
process. The retention of the services of a competent real estate attorney for
that purpose should result in the attorney practicing a form of preventive
law on behalf of the client. The practice of preventive law by an attorney is
439. Id. at 518-24.
440. See, e.g., 3 MILLER, supra note 436, § 7:16, at 64-65.
441. Smith, supra note 10, at 523.
442. Id.
[VOL. 79:311
2003] ASSURANCES OF TITLES TO REAL PROPERTY 367
usually less costly for a client than when the client must rely upon an attor-
ney to provide legal services that constitute a practice of curative law.
Portions of this article also demonstrate that there are circumstances
under which a person who assures a quality of title may be liable to the as-
sured for defects in the title caused by conduct on the part of the assured.
However, those situations may be characterized as exceptions rather than
the norm. It appears that the legal doctrines that are used to resolve such an
issue are sufficient to produce outcomes that are arguably within the rea-
sonable expectations of the parties and which prevent people from receiving
a benefit their improper or wrongful conduct.

